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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. The political crisis and violent conflict that followed the disputed presidential election
results in December 2007 threatened the very existence of Kenya as a nation-state.
However, in January 2008, following the mediation by the African Union Panel of
Eminent African Personalities (chaired by Mr. Kofi Annan), the parties to the dispute
constituted the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR). On 28 February
2008, the parties - the Government/Party of National Unity (PNU), and the Orange
Democratic Movement (ODM) - signed the Agreement on Principles of Partnership of
the Coalition Government. The two parties working under the KNDR initiative agreed
to tackle four main agenda items to end the political crisis and address its underlying
causes.
2. South Consulting has been monitoring implementation of the agreements under each
of the four agenda items. This summary presents key findings for the period between
January and April 2009. Data upon which this report is based was collected using a mix
of methods including interviews and review of secondary information. A survey on
social-political situation in the post-election violence areas was also conducted during
the period (see Annex I: ‘Situation Assessment of Post-Election Violence Areas’).
Summary of Findings
3. Agenda Item 1: Immediate Action to Stop Violence and Restore Fundamental Rights.
One important achievement is that political violence has generally stopped. There is
calm in the areas where political violence occurred. However, gang or criminal violence
and resource-based conflicts have been on the increase. Illegal armed groups have been
mutating and taking different forms. Although some groups formed as ‘political militia’,
they have accumulated money through criminal activities such as extortion and
increasingly become independent of politicians. Embedded in politics and crime, the
groups now tend to hold hostage the same politicians who brought them up. The
politicians can no longer control them but the groups’ engagement with politicians
gives them a sense of false legitimacy.
4. Individual members of these groups may have infiltrated the public security sector
through the ongoing recruitment processes. This would broaden their network of
operation and make it difficult to deal with them. Well-known and most feared groups
are now routinely providing a brand name and franchise for upcoming militia.
5. How to address the problem of ‘militia’ at present poses a huge dilemma for everyone
concerned with human rights. On the one hand, human rights defenders have been
advocating respect for the sanctity of human life and on the other hand, citizens appear
to publicly support extra-judicial killing of suspected militia members. Without a clear
policy framework to deal with these groups, they will continue growing in number and
expand their scope and coverage of operations.
6. With regard to restoring fundamental freedoms, the ban on live television and radio
broadcasts was lifted and the enactment of the Kenya Communications (Amendment)
Act, 2008, suspended to allow further consultations between the Government and the
media. However, the country continued to suffer significant drawbacks on fundamental
rights and freedoms. These challenges around the enjoyment of rights and freedoms
imply a constrained democratic space and impede not only political growth but also
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economic development. Without rights, it will be difficult to make economic
achievements.
7. Agenda Item 2: Addressing the Humanitarian Crisis, and Promoting Healing and
Reconciliation. All officially-established Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) camps
have been closed down and emptied of IDPs. The government’s resettlement
programme assisted those who were willing to return and a humanitarian fund assisted
them to re-establish their lives. Peace and Reconciliation Committees have been
established in post-election areas. The government has deployed to post-election
violence areas Special District Officers (DOs) trained in peace and conflict resolution.
Healing and reconciliation have witnessed increased involvement of local and national
politicians.
8. In spite of these achievements, the situation of IDPs has not improved. Many continue
to live in deplorable ‘transit’ camps. In the new camps, they have no access to services.
They also continue receiving threats of further eviction every time there are political
conflicts at the national level. Public and media attention on IDPs has decreased and
their vulnerability is on the increase.
9. Leaders are using the IDP problem as a political resource. They are using the IDPs to
bargain their various political positions, including forming political alliances. At the
same time, there are concerns that the concept of IDPs is used increasingly in reference
to members of one ethnic community yet other communities suffered displacement and
deaths during the crisis. This has and continues to undermine efforts to promote
healing and reconciliation, and national cohesion in general.
10. Over 2000 Kenyan refugees are still in Uganda one year after the political violence. The
refugees are yet to receive assistance from the government of Kenya. Many prefer to
remain in Uganda because they have access to land there. There are those who fear that
they will be prosecuted for participating in post-election violence if they returned.
11. Agenda Item 3: How to Overcome the Political Crisis (power sharing). Both parties
shared Cabinet positions but the Coalition Government continues to lack cohesion and
is still perceived as ‘two-governments-in-one’. Unfortunately, divisions between the
two coalition partners have continued to deepen and to be the main cause of
disillusionment among the citizenry. Individual parties in the coalition also have
internal divisions that continue to affect the coalition itself. New alliances and loyalties
form and fragment on the basis of many divisions. For this reason, party leaders have
no effective control of their own members within and outside Parliament. To resolve
the disputes within the coalition, the partners established a Permanent Committee on
Management of Coalition Affairs. This is a good attempt at resolving disputes but the
Committee has not been used effectively.
12. The greatest threat to reforms and to future political stability is the lack of unity in the
coalition. Individual leaders are yet to transcend their differences and demonstrate
unity of purpose. Political elites are apparently much more concerned about defending
and/or acquiring more power than creating conditions to deliver reforms.
Disagreement over distribution of power and patronage is likely to spill over into the
constitutional review process and complicate the delivery of a new Constitution.
13. Agenda Item 4: Tackling Long-term Issues. Establishment of the Committee of
Experts on the Constitutional Review marks an important step towards achieving many
vi

of the reforms identified in Agenda Item 4. Nominees of members to the Truth, Justice
and Reconciliation Commission were identified during the period. Providing a new
Constitution is critical to solving the causes of post-election violence. However, the
Committee has experienced delays in accessing government-allocated funds. A slow
start will certainly affect the committee’s work plan and possibly delay completion of
the review process. However, the public is eagerly awaiting a new Constitution and
failure to deliver it on time will result in increased disillusionment and feed the growing
anger against political leaders at all levels.
14. The slow pace of activities in other reform components, including land reforms, is
worrying. The Cabinet had not discussed the National Land Policy by the end of April
2009. The document has been the subject of debate for several years and the continued
delays in effecting land reforms – even as the country awaits a new Constitution – will
create space for the landed elite to defeat the very purpose of the National Land Policy.
As history and experience have shown everywhere, the landed elite are the most vicious
opponents of land reforms. Given space and opportunity, they can gang up to fight land
reforms and to deny the land-poor their rights to land.
15. Considering Agenda Item 4’s critical importance to the future of Kenya, the slow pace
of reforms outlined in Agenda 4 is a cause for concern. Mobilising various
constituencies to speed up reforms in all respects is critical. But conflicts within the
Grand Coalition will certainly undermine not only the speed but also the nature of
reforms to be realised.
16. Implementing Recommendations by Commissions of Inquiry. Although there is visible
progress in implementing some of the recommendations by Commissions of Inquiry,
there is also a marked tendency to renege on some of the principles that shaped these
recommendations. In this regard, the process of recruiting members of IIEC was highly
politicised and members selected on ethno-regional basis. Thus the new electoral body
has had a negative beginning. Also, the attempt to establish a Special Tribunal to try
perpetrators of post-election violence witnessed highly politicised debate, much of
which had ethnic overtones. Ethnic interests and considerations tend to inform
composition of various bodies constituted to facilitate reforms. This is against the
principles that shaped recommendations by IREC and CIPEV.
17. The country, and the political leaders in particular, seem to quickly forget the principles
that shaped these recommendations; the principles sought to fight impunity and erode
the basis of ethnicity as drivers of politics. Objective delivery of responsibility by the
new bodies is required for restoration of public confidence.
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Conclusion
18. The progress towards implementing crucial actions under each of the agenda items has
been slow. How some of the issues are undertaken is also undermining the quest for
healing and reconciliation. Furthermore, divisions in the coalition are leading to the
perception of a ‘two-governments-in-one’ and feeding public disillusionment and
dissatisfaction with the Coalition Government’s commitment to deliver on its goal:
achievement of sustainable peace, stability and justice in Kenya.
19. It is apparent that the momentum for radical reforms has been lost. The speed towards
another General Election is increasing whereas addressing some of the proximate and
structural factors that led to unprecedented political violence is on a slow start. Political
cohesion in the Coalition Government and reforms in general are very critical for the
stability and prosperity of the country. Without undertaking fundamental reforms,
another violent civil conflict may occur. In order to prevent the recurrence of violent
conflict, it is imperative that the country addresses the problem of poverty, land
reforms, and causes of impunity, and fast-track the constitutional review process. It is
also imperative for the Committee of Experts to deliver a democratic constitution
rather than what the politicians desire – a Constitution that satisfies their quest for
power and satisfaction of personal interests.
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1.

INTRODUCTION

1.

On 27 December 2007, Kenya held its fourth General Election after the re-introduction
of multi-party democracy in 1991. Although the electoral process was generally
peaceful, the presidential election result provoked a dispute between the Party of
National Unity (PNU) and the main opposition, Orange Democratic Movement (ODM).
Following the dispute, an unprecedented wave of violence erupted in several regions of
the country. Over 1,000 people were killed while over 600,000 were displaced from
their homes. What began as a dispute over the results of the presidential election
rapidly transformed into a civil conflict that threatened the existence of Kenya as a
nation-state.

2.

The political conflict brought to the surface issues dividing Kenyans and undermining
national cohesion. It was clear that the country was rapidly going down a familiar road
trodden by other African countries where parties dispute election results -- signs of civil
war were becoming apparent. It was evident that the country was getting divided into
ethno-regional blocs, along the lines that the different groups had voted.

3.

International mediation began in early January 2008. Under the auspices of the
African Union, the Panel of Eminent African Personalities, chaired by Mr. Kofi Annan,
succeeded in persuading the parties to agree to mediation. The Kenya National
Dialogue and Reconciliation was the forum for dialogue and mediation. By the
beginning of February 2008, the parties had agreed on a series of steps to address the
crisis. They agreed on actions to immediately halt the violence and restore fundamental
rights, as well as to address the humanitarian crisis that was deepening as violence
spread to various regions. Finally, on 28 February 2008, the parties signed the
‘Agreement on the Principles of Partnership of the Coalition Government.’

4.

Following the signing of the ‘Agreement on the Principles of Partnership of the
Coalition Government’ the National Accord and Reconciliation Act of 2008 was
enacted. The Accord established a framework for power sharing so as to resolve the
political crisis. The framework was based on the overall goal of the National Accord:
Achievement of sustainable peace, stability, and justice in Kenya through the rule of
law and respect for human rights.

5.

The mediation framework identified four central agenda points for this purpose. These
were:
(a) Agenda Item 1: Immediate action to stop violence and restore fundamental
rights and liberties;
(b) Agenda Item 2: Immediate measures to address the humanitarian crisis,
and promote healing and reconciliation;
(c) Agenda Item 3: How to overcome the political crisis; and
(d) Agenda Item 4: Addressing long-term issues, including constitutional and
institutional reforms; land reforms; poverty and inequalities; youth
unemployment; national cohesion; and transparency and accountability.

6.

The KNDR process prioritised constitutional review and undertaking institutional
reforms. The framework also established several institutional arrangements to address
various aspects of the political crisis. These included:
1

(a) An Independent Review Commission on the General Elections held in Kenya on
December 27, 2007(IREC);
(b) A Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence (CIPEV); and
(c) Establishing a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC)
(d) Initiating a mechanism for the constitutional review process
7.

The Coalition Government was responsible for implementing the recommendations
from the findings of these inquiries. Both IREC and CIPEV completed their work and
handed in their reports. The process of establishing a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation
Commission (TJRC) is already under way.

8.

This report is the second review of progress in the implementation of the Kenya
National Dialogue and Reconciliation agreements. The report covers the period
between January and April 2009.
Methodology

9.

A mix of methods was employed to gather data and generate findings for this report. A
team of researchers interviewed various respondents on different agenda items. The
respondents included government officials in relevant ministries and/or institutions;
experts/specialists in different fields and with knowledge on specific agenda items;
individuals with key knowledge on certain issues; and ordinary citizens. The research
team also held Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) with different people in areas that
experienced violence in the aftermath of the elections.

10.

Secondary data was obtained by reviewing existing data and reports from the
government and other agencies. Data from media reports, reports by nongovernmental organisations, United Nations agencies and other studies have been
integrated in the analysis.

11.

Finally, South Consulting commissioned a study in areas affected by post-election
violence. These include 28 administrative districts spread across five provinces of
Kenya. At the same time, some 200 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) were
interviewed in the camps where they were living. The aim of the IDP-specific study was
to obtain data on IDPs’ observations of their own situation. This complemented
findings from the survey conducted in regions that experienced post-election violence.
The findings of this survey are integrated in this report. The findings are presented
separately in full as an annex to this report.

12.

This report first outlines the key issues as identified by the mediation agreements. This
is followed by what studies have found out and the implications of these findings for
the National Accord. The conclusions and recommendations are based on these
analyses. In many instances, however, the data has been left to speak for itself.

13.

This report takes care to remain objective and, as far as possible, to let the data speak
for itself. The starting point for this analysis is that implementation of the key agenda
items remains critical to the future of the Kenyan nation. We are aware that
information collected on the implementation of the National Accord is sensitive to
personal vested interests and political realities – we live in a divided society. Because of
this, people may want to interpret the findings selectively from their own points of view
and in a manner that suits their personal and/or group interests. A subjective
interpretation of the data and/or the use of the report’s findings to suit narrow
2

interests, will harm, rather than build the nation.
Structure of the Report
14.

The report has been organised into sections corresponding to each of the KNDR’s
agenda items.
(i) Section 2 – Agenda Item 1
(ii) Section 3 – Agenda Item 2
(iii)Section 4 – Agenda Item 3
(iv) Section 5 – Agenda Item 4
(v) Section 6 – Commissions of Inquiry
(vi) Section 7 – Conclusions

15.

In addition, there are three annexes. Annex I tabulates the findings, Annex II contains
survey findings on Situation analysis of Post-Election Violence Areas (PEV): Survey
Findings. Annex III contains survey findings in power-point format.
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2.

AGENDA ITEM 1: IMMEDIATE ACTION TO STOP VIOLENCE AND
RESTORE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES

Background
16.

The mediation process identified certain steps that both parties would undertake to end
violence. On February 1, 2008, the mediation team outlined measures the police and
the public, political leaders and the media would undertake to end violence. The police
were required to act in accordance with the constitution and the law and, in particular,
the Police Act and the Forces Standing Orders. Security forces were required to carry
out their duties and responsibilities with complete impartiality and without regard to
ethnicity, political persuasion or other partisan consideration. The mediation team
required that deployment of security agents should at all times aim to promote and
reflect national integration and harmony. It required Kenyan citizens to stop all acts of
violence. Illegal armed groups and militias were to be disbanded.

17.

With regard to the restoration of fundamental rights and liberties, the mediation team
called for the development of a suitable code of conduct to regulate live broadcasts in
consultation with the Media Council of Kenya. The code of conduct was to elaborate on
provisions for punitive measures in case of abuse.

18.

The mediation team also called for facilitation and protection of peaceful assembly, as
well as impartial and expeditious investigation of all cases of crime and police brutality
and/or excessive use of force. Hate and threatening messages, leaflets, short message
texts (sms), or any other broadcast of that nature had to stop forthwith, and
prosecutions against criminal activities undertaken immediately.

19.

In this section of the report, we examine the extent to which the various aspects of this
agenda item have been implemented. In doing so, we note that the previous report
pointed out that there was no systematic approach to disarmament and demobilisation
of illegal armed groups. The manner in which these groups operated during the postelection violence made it difficult to demobilise and disband them but after the
violence, they simply disappeared.2 The report noted that these groups were only
dormant and politically inactive at the time but could be re-activated with ease.
Secondly, the report noted that the groups were likely to be better prepared, organised
and armed with sophisticated weapons were another wave of political violence to come.
The youth bulge in the population and the attendant unemployment, we argued, has
complicated the issues around illegal armed groups.

20.

With regard to restoration of fundamental rights, the previous report observed that
democracy was clearly in recession. The space for freedoms had rapidly contracted
compared to the period before the 2007 elections. The police in several parts of the
country, in particular, forcibly and violently disrupted demonstrations by IDPs.

21.

Progress in implementing key aspects of this agenda item during the period between
January and April 2009 is an issue we now turn to. The focus is on the following:

2

The CIPEV report did indicate that where the violence was spontaneous, the groups fizzled out but where it
was organized, the groups are still in place though inactive.
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(a) Stopping violence;
(b) Enhancing the security and protection of the population and its property; and
(c) Ensuring that freedom of expression, press freedom and the right to peaceful
assembly are upheld.
Status of Implementation

Summary of findings
 Post-election violence has stopped in all affected areas
 Illegal groups are still in place but their character has changed
 Illegal groups are beholden to politicians, which makes it difficult to disband them
 92 suspects were arrested in connection with the post-election violence in four
provinces and charged in court
 Police compiled a list of 2,600 suspects based on victims and witness testimonies
 35 new police stations have been constructed in areas affected by post-election
violence
 94 police officers have been prosecuted, 344 interdicted, and 7,849 transferred
 4,500 new police officers were recruited and deployed
 40 District Commissioners and 38 Special District Officers were deployed in postelection violence areas
 Police launched crackdown on illegal/criminal groups
 Government is implementing National Action Plan on Small Arms
 2,800 firearms have been collected from civilians and destroyed
 Marking of small firearms is ongoing

Halting Political Violence
22.

Post-Election Violence (PEV) has generally stopped. The forms of violence experienced
during the period of this report and the last quarter of 2008 are not directly related to
the disputed December 2007 election results. Calm has also returned in most areas that
experienced violence in the aftermath of the elections. Residents in these areas are also
generally regaining confidence. In the survey conducted in the post-election violence
areas, as many as 62 per cent believe that violence will not recur in their areas in the
next one year. About 40 per cent of those who think that violence will not recur argue
that there is peace in the area, while another 17 per cent believe that people have learnt
from the past.

23.

All the same, about 26 per cent of the respondents in these areas think that violence
5

will recur. In their view, divisions in the Grand Coalition tend to affect relations at the
local level. They also feel that ‘tribalism’ and incitement by politicians will re-ignite
violence. They also cited inter-communal tension, mistrust and suspicion among local
communities, and political differences as some of the factors that could lead to more
violence. They are also certain about who is likely to promote violence in their areas:
politicians, their supporters, and ‘rival’ ethnic groups.
24.

Asked what are the most important ways of preventing future violence in Kenya, about
20 per cent of respondents identified fighting ‘tribalism’ and another 12 per cent
prosecution of those responsible for violence as important approaches. Holding free
and fair elections (15 per cent) and promoting healing and reconciliation (12 per cent)
were also identified as important. On the whole, this implies that people are more
aware about the potential causes of violence. Thus, democratic governance with specific
emphasis on equal treatment for all ethnic groups and transparent electoral processes
as well as outcomes are important.

25.

The return of calm in the areas that suffered post-election violence, the cessation of
political violence, and the general public confidence that violence will not recur are a
good and positive development.

26.

The absence of overt violence does not, however, mean the presence of sustainable
peace. A disturbing finding is that political conflicts among national elites and in
fighting within the Grand Coalition are translating into tension, animosity and
uncertainty at the local level. These outcomes erode people’s confidence in social
cohesion at the local level. Some feel that violence will recur as a result of these
conflicts. Interviews with respondents in areas affected by the post-election violence
reveal that every time elites disagree over important national issues, hate leaflets are
circulated in certain parts of Rift Valley warning one community to prepare to leave the
area.3 Residents cited debates about eviction of settlers from the Mau Forest, the
Special Tribunal to try perpetrators of the post-2007 election violence and the debates
on the management of maize stocks as examples of national issues that evoke emotions
and breed animosity in the Rift Valley Province.

27.

An important consequence of this linkage between the ‘national and the local forms of
conflict’ is failure to heal and reconcile communities. There are subterranean hatreds
and some levels of intolerance among communities in multi-ethnic areas. These are
manifest in some IDPs’ inability to return to their farms and/or former areas of
residence in a sustainable way. It also explains why some IDPs prefer to buy land for
settlement in new areas rather than return to their former homes.

28.

These findings suggest that debates on national issues should be carried out objectively
and with caution. Mobilising ethnic sentiments in defence or promotion of certain
positions breeds tension and animosity among communities in the Rift Valley. This
tension seems to rise and fall with the intensity of disagreements among and between
national political leaders. The more they disagree, the more the tension rises at the
local level. Political leaders have a responsibility to steer their constituencies towards
national thinking, cohesion and unity. This issue is dealt with in the findings on Agenda

3

In many instances, only members of one community tend to experience threats. However, other
communities are also threatened depending on how their leaders relate to the political leadership in Rift
Valley.
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Item 3 on power sharing.
Demobilisation of Illegal Armed Groups
29.

The mediation statement of commitment to end political violence issued on February 1,
2008 called for demobilisation of illegal armed groups and appealed to the youth
throughout the country to desist from acts of lawlessness. Investigations by the
Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence (the Waki Commission)
revealed that where violence was a ‘spontaneous angry reaction by citizens’, the groups
of youths involved quickly fizzled out.

30.

The previous report noted that there was no systematic effort to disband these groups.
We argued that these groups are dormant. This report notes, yet again, that these
groups are very much alive and, as argued later, have taken different forms both in
composition and focus. Secondly, people in the areas affected by post-election violence
feel that these groups were not organised. But even if they were informal, people have
no evidence that the groups have ceased to exist.

31.

These observations notwithstanding, police records show that in March 2008, police
arrested about 90 post-election violence suspects in Rift Valley, Nyanza, Central and
Nairobi provinces. These suspects were part of 2,600 people whom police had listed as
suspects based on victims’ and witnesses’ accounts.4 The fact that the suspects have not
been tried one year after arrest has undermined the victims’ confidence in the legal
process. It has also entrenched a sense of impunity on the part of the suspects because
no action is taken against them and those who committed various crimes. This sense is
usually reinforced by a celebrative mood among some members of one community
every time a suspect among them is released from custody due to lack of evidence.

32.

How to punish financiers and perpetrators of violence is acrimonious. Secondly, the
question of whether or not to give amnesty to perpetrators of the violence has grown
with time and become enmeshed with the politics of the Grand Coalition. Decisions on
how to deal with post-election violence perpetrators, therefore, risk being lost in the
thick canopy of issues that have continually provided cover for those who commit
political crimes.

33.

Dealing with political violence requires making hard choices. How issues of political
violence are dealt with has important implications for the future stability and unity of
any nation. True to this, there are those of the view that members of an illegal group
that took part in revenge attacks in Nakuru and Naivasha have not been arrested.5 Such
perceptions about the administration of justice may undermine the general spirit of
dealing with post-election violence. If not addressed, these perceptions can frustrate
healing and reconciliation efforts and diminish the impact and deterrence capacity of
the measures taken to deal with impunity.

34.

But why are these groups still in existence? And what are the challenges experienced in
demobilising and disbanding them? These are issues we now turn to.

Interview with a senior police officer, Ministry of State for Provincial Administration and Internal Security,
February 26, 2009.
5 Interview with NGO official in Nairobi, March 14, 2009.
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Figure 1: Why do you think these groups have not been disbanded or demobilised in
your area?
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Challenges in Demobilising Illegal Armed Groups
35.

Mutation, Changing Forms and Branding of Groups: The activities and visibility of
illegal armed groups indicate a gradual mutation and shifting of their reasons for
existence. Some groups have mutated from religio-cultural sects to ‘personal’ or ethnic
militia and to criminal extortion gangs. For this reason, there are at least three main
types of groups in operation in different parts of the country. One is criminal and
extortion gang. Two is political or ethnic militia some of which are tied to politicians or
tend to act like ‘personal’ gangs. The third are groups that overlap the other two. It is
worth recognising that some groups emerged for the purpose of supporting certain
politicians on ethnic considerations, but they have become relatively autonomous from
the politicians. Accumulation of money through criminal activities such as extortion
has made groups increasingly independent of politicians. ‘They now control a lot of
money and can do without godfathers’.6

36.

Group names used as a Brand Name: Importantly, new gangs that come up tend to use
the tactics and names of those already known and most feared (e.g. Mungiki and

6

Interview with a senior police officer.

8

Taliban) in order to cause fear, which has become a means for extortion. For this
reason, Mungiki is now used like a franchise; it is a brand name. Media reports show
instances where new gangs use the name Mungiki in order to announce their presence
and have impact.
37.

Factionalism within Groups: Accumulation of wealth and autonomy from politicians
have created new problems for some of the illegal armed groups. The struggle to
control wealth has resulted in intra-group factionalism and rivalry. Some groups tend
to split into different and competing factions, with each of them keen to control funds
obtained through extortion. Factionalism has had another effect -- it has clouded lines
of communication and eliminated central command and control.

38.

With groups forming and mutating regularly, and others such as Mungiki being
franchised, the scope and coverage of their illegal activities has widened. In the slums,
for instance, the groups provide security and other services.7 Interestingly, there are
instances where people value their services because they argue that they are efficient
and effective in providing services compared to formal institutions. A disturbing trend,
however, is the tension between the politicians’ personal gangs and the extortion gangs.
Competition between these two groups presents a dangerous recipe for gang violence in
urban slums.8

39.

Embedded in Politics: There are groups that are still tied to politicians. Because of their
significance to the political careers of many politicians, those tied to these groups are
held hostage. They have trapped politicians into paying ‘allowances’ to secure the
groups’ allegiance and ‘protection’.9 Arguably, their engagement with politicians and
tacit recognition of the informal power they wield as well as politicians’ calls for official
negotiations with them provide false legitimacy for the militias and complicates efforts
to disband them.

40.

People also feel that it is difficult to disband these groups because politicians support
them. Those allied to politicians ‘tend to become untouchable’.10 In the survey
conducted in the areas that experienced post-election violence, about 50 per cent of the
people interviewed identified politicians and political parties as the main financiers of
these groups. Again, because of this, the groups tend to enjoy political protection.
Combined with the false legitimacy that they enjoy because of political cover, the
groups operate without let or hindrance. At the same time, there have been allegations
of police complicity and liaison with criminal gangs. Because of this, some people fear
reporting criminal gangs to the police - information may leak out to the gangs.

41.

Lack of Evidence for Prosecution: The citizens’ reluctance to provide information about
illegal armed groups compounds the lack of forensic evidence to secure prosecution of
and conviction of suspects.11 Those arrested are released for lack of evidence. Once
suspects are back in the society, citizens realise the futility of reporting to the police.
Given people’s reluctance to provide information to the police, it becomes extremely

Interviews in Nairobi’s Mlango Kubwa in Eastlands and Mathare Mabatini.
Interviews in Kibera and Kayole, February 2009. See also ongoing research by NPI-Africa and CSVR on the
changing forms of violence in Southern Africa and the Great Lakes Region.
9 Interview with senior police officer, Ministry of Provincial Administration and Internal Security, February 26,
2009.
10 Interview with a senior police officer, March 2009.
11 Ibid; also key informant interviews in 32 districts affected by PEV, February-March 2009.
7

8

9

difficult to gather intelligence about the groups’ activities or planned crimes.12
42.

Infiltration into Public Service Institutions, including Law and Order: Members of
these groups may also have infiltrated law and order institutions, including the police
service and other security organs through the process of regular recruitment into the
public service. A respondent pointed out that ‘politicians who pay these groups to
campaign for them have been forced to pay by getting them jobs in the public sector or
anywhere else where there is an opportunity for employment’.13 Members of these
groups, therefore, are likely to be found everywhere.’14

43.

Finally, several police officers have lost their lives at the hands of these gangs. In the
period between January and February 2009 alone, 11 police officers were killed in the
line of duty. Some of these officers could be victims of illegal armed gangs. In March
2009, gangs killed three officers in a week.15 Targeting the individual officers may be
adding to the challenge of dealing with these groups. This could be contributing to the
feeling that the police are unable to protect citizens. However, the police are concerned
that human rights groups are not as vocal when criminals kill law enforcement officers
as they are when the reverse is the case. One officer said, ‘Any encounter with armed
criminals implies life or death; either they get you or you get them first. Yet no one talks
about human rights when these criminals kill police officers.’16 On the whole, a hostile
public has had the effect of forcing police officers to adopt a cavalier attitude, thereby
leaving these gangs to flourish.

44.

Journalists have also faced similar threats, especially when they write stories about
illegal gangs. To them, it has become very dangerous to write anything about these
groups because ‘they threaten you as an individual’.17 These individualised threats can
undermine access to information on these groups and reduce the effectiveness of
strategies to deal with them.

45.

The police statistics below show the number of police officers killed in the line of duty:
POLICE OFFICERS KILLED IN LINE OF DUTY
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Interview with a senior government officer in Naivasha, February 27, 2009.
Interview with a senior police officer, op cit.
14 Focus Group Discussion with grassroots organisations working in informal settlements in Nairobi, February
21, 2009.
15 Daily Nation, March 19, 2009.
16 Interview with a police officer, February 6, 2009.
17 Ibid
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46.

A discussion of these challenges points to the need to reform the criminal justice
system and also punish politicians who support armed groups. Insufficient evidence to
prosecute criminals, together with the growing culture of lynching suspects, and
increasing forms of extortion by criminals suggest that urgent measures are needed to
rout these groups. According to a senior government officer, reforms should be
comprehensive and cut across all institutions of the criminal justice system, and not
only the police force. In his view, efforts to change attitudes towards the police should
be enhanced:
‘Kenyans hate the police, so the police are really on their own. We arrest a
criminal, but get a call from a senior politician or a government official
telling us to release him. If we don’t, they call the media and NGOs, who
come and attack the police. When we arrest suspects, people complain that
gangs will harass them, and the courts release them for lack of evidence.
People cry there is no security. How are we supposed to protect Kenyans?
Kenyans need to understand our problems.’18
Trends in (Dis) armament

47.

Arms Recovered from Civilians: Between February 2008 and January 2009, the
government had recovered 2,800 firearms from civilians.19 These recoveries included
guns voluntarily surrendered by civilians or forcibly retrieved from criminals and cattle
rustlers. These arms were set on fire on March 17, 2009 during the annual anniversary
of the signing of the Nairobi Protocol on Disarmament. However, Parliament is yet to
make amendments to the present law on illegal arms. The amendments provide for stiff
penalties for possession, trading, conveying and dealing in illegal firearms.20

48.

Fears of Armament for Future Violence: In February 2009, police intercepted five
caches of arms in Nandi District. This could be an indication of the possibility of arms
flows into the country.21 The Kenya Police Crime Report and Data for 2008 shows that
armed crime, including stock theft, increased by 37 per cent, and criminal damage by
33 per cent. These trends show a rise in increasing illegal firearms that could be used in
situations of political violence. Interviews at the local level also show that discourses on
threats and violence include frequent reference to guns.22 The porous borders with
some countries in conflict could be making it easy for arms to cross into Kenya. Illegal
groups could access such guns with relative ease.

49.

National Action Plan on Small Arms under Implementation: The government has been
implementing the National Action Plan for Arms Control and Management in line with
the 2004 Nairobi Protocol on Disarmament.23 Some of the ongoing activities to control
arms flows include an assessment of small arms (with UNDP), marking of small arms
with support from the Regional Centre for Small Arms (RECSA), non-violent

Interview with senior police officer, op cit.
with senior police officer, Ministry of State for Provincial Administration and Internal Security,
February 26, 2009.
20 Interview with Kenya National Focal Point on Small Arms, 23 January 2009; see also Daily Nation, March
18, 2009: ‘Death Row Beckons for Gun Owners’.
21 Ibid
22 Interviews in Nakuru, February 27, 2009.
23 Interview with Kenya National Focal Point on Small Arms, January 13, 2009.
18

19Interview
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disarmament through amnesty for those who surrender firearms, and themed research
and investigation on the whereabouts, movement patterns and use of arms that have
fallen silent in South Sudan.24
50.

In response to concerns about arms flows and allegations of increased secret armament
of illegal groups, the Government, in collaboration with UNDP and the Regional Centre
for Small Arms, is undertaking a number of initiatives to determine the level of
proliferation. These include:
(a) Small arms assessment in the North Rift Valley region to be followed by a
national assessment;
(b) Marking of small arms with support from the Regional Centre for Small Arms
(RECSA);
(c) Ongoing non-violent disarmament in cattle-rustling areas; and
(d) Research by RECSA, the government and UNDP on movement of arms and use
to which they are put.

51.

In spite of these measures, there is no strategy in place yet for disarming illegal groups.
The findings from these investigations and small arms assessments will be used to
develop a concise small arms strategy.25 Further, there is no information or follow up
on illegal arms that had been imported into the country in the period between February
and March 2008. Since the arms were allegedly meant for militia operations, it is
important to establish their final destination.

Enhancing Security and Protection of the Population
52.

The mediation agreement emphasised the need to enhance security and protect the
population. This was critical for the restoration of peace, especially in the areas where
post-election violence was intensifying. In the previous report, we noted that some of
the measures taken to enhance security of the population included building new police
stations and increasing the number of officers to improve security in these areas.

53.

Findings show that the government has completed construction of 35 new police
stations in areas affected by post-election violence. However, in some areas, the new
stations do not have sufficient staff. Also, the police posts are constructed in ‘return
areas’ or close to transit camps where IDPs are camping as they tend their farms.
Establishing police posts adjacent to IDP areas, unfortunately, has created an
impression that the police posts are meant to protect IDPs rather than all communities.
In some areas, the police posts are viewed with resentment. Because of this, peacebuilding initiatives in such areas tend to have more IDPs than anyone else.

54.

This finding undermines the mediation agreement on security measures, which
emphasised the need for security forces to carry out their activities without reference to
ethnicity or political and partisan considerations. Security forces are required to
promote national integration and cohesion. Although there are no findings showing
biases in favour of IDPs, the fact that other local communities have the impression that

24
25

Interview with Kenya National Focal Point on Small Arms, op cit.
Interview with Kenya National Focal Point on Small Arms, op cit.
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security is meant for IDPs does not augur well for healing and reconciliation. The
government must urgently erode the basis for this impression. Failure to do so will
make the work of security agents very difficult because some people may want to
simply disobey them since, in their view, their work is protecting IDPs.
55.

Additional Personnel: 40 new District Commissioners have been deployed to new
districts and post-election violence areas. Another 38 ‘Special District Officers’ trained
on peace-building have also been deployed in these areas. The DOs are charged with
the responsibility of fast tracking healing and reconciliation and returning the regions
into normalcy. Gender desks have been established in all police stations. Shortage of
female police officers has prevented the full operationalisation of gender desks.26
Further, in general, a total of 4,500 new police officers have been recruited in an
endeavour to meet the international standards on police-citizen ratio and to raise the
number of police officers available to serve Kenyans.27

56.

The government has also completed the rehabilitation of 110 schools in Rift Valley,
Nyanza and Western provinces at a cost of Ksh124 million. The Kenya military and
partners such as the Kenya Red Cross and Mabati Rolling Mills have supported the
rehabilitation and expansion of schools hosting IDPs.

57.

These are important initiatives by the government. However, the impact of these
initiatives is not sustainable without a comprehensive policy on healing and
reconciliation. These initiatives, on their own, may not lead to sustainable peace if
national leaders continue mobilising against each other on an ethnic basis. As already
noted, national level political conflicts tend to trickle to the local level where they
heighten animosity between groups. Since a comprehensive constitutional review can
provide a basis for addressing these differences and provide opportunities for
embedding ‘inclusive politics’, it is important that the reform processes be completed
with speed and in a manner that satisfies Kenyans.

58.

In the meantime, training of male police officers on gender issues is important. Gender
desks should not be managed by female officers only. Men should also be sensitised on
issues affecting women at all times so that they can respond to gender issues during
times of conflict.

59.

Integrity and Discipline of the Police: The mediation agreement underlined the
importance of police undertaking their duties with objectivity and impartiality. On
account of this, police have taken measures to restore discipline and integrity in the
force. Disciplinary measures have been taken against errant police officers to ‘ensure
professional service delivery and protection of the population by security officers.’
Between January 2008 and February 2009, about 437 officers had been dismissed
from the police force for unprofessional behaviour.

26

Focus on only women officers has been criticized as gender insensitive and unresponsive to the needs of
vulnerable men. Interview with NGO worker, April 8, 2009

27

Interview with senior government officer in the Ministry of Internal Security, February 12, 2009.
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60.

Police officers found guilty of offences such as aiding a prisoner to escape,
manslaughter, corruption, misuse of firearm, and other crimes have been duly
disciplined. For instance, between January 2008 and February 2009, 344 police
officers of different ranks were interdicted. Another 206 police officers were
prosecuted for conspiracy, forgery, rape, losing or misuse of firearm, murder and
corruption or other offences. Of those prosecuted, 94 have been convicted, including
five in the first two months of 2009.

61.

Again, while these are important measures, some respondents have observed that the
police officers sacked from the police force are likely to end up joining criminal
gangs.28 Furthermore, in spite of these measures, gang and vigilante violence is on the
rise, IDPs continue to face threats, including malicious grazing on their crops,29 and
threats of repeat displacement. Signs of violence continue in some parts of Rift Valley
and in line with conflicts among the national level elites. For instance, hate leaflets
were circulated in Northern Rift Valley in the second week of February 2009 warning
certain communities to leave the area because leaders from those communities had
supported a motion in Parliament to censure a Minister from the Rift Valley over
allegations of corruption.30 Such developments indicate that the country is still prone
to identity politics and threats of violence may impede the fight against impunity.
Restoring the Sanctity of Human Life

62.

The mediation statement on security measures was emphatic about the sanctity of
human life. Among other measures, the statement called upon the police to refrain
from using live bullets on unarmed civilians. However, findings show that there have
been cases of extra-judicial killings. For instance, in February 2009, the UN Special
Rapporteur on Extra-judicial, Arbitrary or Summary Executions noted that extrajudicial executions by the police are ‘systematic, widespread and well planned’.31 The
police denied taking part in extra-judicial killings and charged that some human
rights defenders were receiving payment from some of these groups. At the same
time, human rights organisations also complained of police involvement in extra-

Interview with a civil society organisation official in Nairobi, January 30, 2009.
OCHA, Humanitarian Update, Vol. 44, p6.
30 In addition, the media reported that leaders from the Minister’s community had met at the time the censure
motion was proposed; see the Sunday Standard, February 8, 2009, ‘Corruption Claims Trigger Hidden Wars
Inside ODM’.
31 See Alston Report at The Standard Website, http://www.eastandard.net
28
29
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judicial killings, observing that this was a phenomenon that had been going on for a
while. Parliament held a special session to discuss extra-judicial killings.
63.

The release of the UN Special Rapporteur’s preliminary report and corroboration of its
findings by human rights groups precipitated demonstrations by some of the illegal
armed groups. Ordinary citizens in some parts of Central Kenya reacted by violently
disrupting these demonstrations and killing those suspected to be members of these
groups.32 Fear of retaliation by members of these groups has led to displacement of
people, and in particular business people in several urban centres in parts of Central
Kenya.33 In tandem with the release of the report, two human rights defenders working
with a human rights organisation – Oscar Foundation– that campaigned against extrajudicial killings were shot dead and many other human rights defenders threatened
with execution.34

64.

How to address the problem of ‘militia’, vigilante groups and other organisations poses
a dilemma for everyone concerned with human rights. On the one hand, human rights
defenders have been advocating respect for the sanctity of human life, including for
members of illegal groups. On the other hand, citizens appear to publicly support extrajudicial killing of suspected militia members. In several parts of central Kenya, ordinary
citizens have established vigilante groups to not only defend themselves against the
illegal groups but also to hunt down and exterminate them. The rapid spread of village
defence groups is likely to degenerate into a chaotic situation in which groups will be
fighting each other. This will make both rural and urban areas ungovernable.

65.

These findings indicate that a culture of impunity is solidifying at all levels. Hate
leaflets, visibility of activities by illegal groups, the killing of human rights defenders,
and continuing threats against IDPs every time the national elite disagree is indicative
of a situation that can explode if political violence were to recur. In fact, popular
support for death is a signal of a society that has become violent and one where there is
little trust in institutions that promote law and order. These pointers signify the urgent
need to urgently finalise constitutional reforms in order to create room for reinvigoration of all institutions.

66.

Urgency in undertaking reforms is critical for another reason. There are emerging signs
of a class conflict in some parts of the country. The poor and the landless are the core of
the illegal groups whether in rural or urban areas; whether in Central or Rift Valley
provinces. Given that some of the groups have origins in the ‘ethnic land clashes’ of the
early 1990s, it is possible that some of these groups focus on the rich and the landed.
With deepening poverty and unemployment among the youth, this possibility is not far
fetched if there are no adequate reforms to meet current challenges.

Restoration of Freedoms and Rights
67.

The previous report noted regression with respect to freedoms, and freedom of
assembly in particular. Some progress has been made with regard to restoring

The Standard, March 23, 2009, p8, ‘Two Men Beheaded in Suspected Mungiki Attacks’.
Field-based interviews in Murang’a and Thika; see also Daily Nation, January 3, 2009, ‘Mungiki Issues
Payment Notices to Business Community in Central Province Towns’.
34 civil society letter to the President and the Prime Minister, March 2009.
32
33
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fundamental rights after the signing of the mediation agreement.
68.

Freedoms: The government has increasingly constrained citizens’ enjoyment of
fundamental freedoms. To some analysts, the government is afraid that the country has
not sufficiently stabilised to allow for the enjoyment of unlimited freedoms as before
the violence.35 The period under review witnessed violent and forcible eviction of IDPs
from some of the remaining camps. Citizens demanding that MPs pay taxes on their
allowances were also violently dispersed during the period under review.
Demonstrations by teachers who were demanding better terms of service were also
violently dispersed. These are significant drawbacks to the country’s democratisation
process. Challenges around enjoyment of rights imply a constrained democratic space.
The gains in the enjoyment of freedoms and rights made in the period between 2003
and 2007 should be effectively guarded because they laid a firm foundation for the
development of the country.
Figure 2: Do you think the government’s response to public demonstrations today is likely
to be forceful/violent or not likely to be forceful/violent?
Don't Know
9%

Violent
58%
Not Violent
33%

69.

35

Press Freedom: In January 2008, the government established a Media Monitoring Unit
to examine discussions on radio and television stations. Following the findings by this
Unit, the government suspended live broadcasting so as to stop ‘dangerous reporting’.
The government lifted the ban on live television and radio broadcasts in March 2008
and presented offensive materials to the Media Council of Kenya for action. The council
has not taken action.

Focus Group Discussion with a grassroots advocacy organisation, Nairobi, February 24, 2009.
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70.

From this development, one can discern a clear disconnect between the media and the
government. While both claim to be acting in the public interest, their actions are at
variance. To some officials in government, the media is irresponsible. The media failed
to censor broadcast information in accordance with the interests of stability and to
protect the image of the nation. To them, the ‘journalists only report bad stories
because that is what sells … success stories are not reported … This is the only country
in the world where they show you dead bodies on their screens ... It is because of this
irresponsibility that the government must exert control’.36

71.

The media, on the other hand, observe that the space for press freedom has been
getting constrained from the time of the political violence. Some see passage of the
Kenya Communications (Amendment) Act of 2009 – which seeks to regulate media
content among other things -- in this context. Although the law was passed and
received presidential assent, the period preceding these events witnessed protests and
fervent appeals by the media, who argued that the Act was an affront to freedom of
expression. Negotiations between the media and the Government have yielded
consensus where some of the offensive clauses are due to be amended.

72.

The media play an important watchdog role in any transition. Freedom of the media is
required today more than ever before, particularly because the country is slowly
emerging from a major crisis. It is important to watch over this space to ensure that the
country does not roll back past gains and consolidate them for the future. Furthermore,
in the absence of an official opposition, the country must build formidable institutions
to keep vigilance on the Grand Coalition and the transition to political stability. A free
and responsible media can play an important role in this respect.
CONCLUSIONS

73.

The findings show that post-election violence has generally stopped. There is no overt
conflict directly related to the disputed elections. However, tensions remain high in
affected areas of the Rift Valley, where the uneasy calm has made it difficult for IDPs to
return and resettle in their homes in a sustainable manner. The subterranean tensions
between the different communities come into the open every time the political elite
conflict at the national level. National level conflicts among politicians thus are an
obstacle to healing and reconciliation at the local level.

74.

Illegal armed groups are still in place. However, they are not currently engaged in
political violence. The scope of their activities is broadening and their boldness
growing. The resolve with which they are committing crimes is an issue of concern.
They have also transformed into ‘criminal groups,’ which are autonomous of politicians
who brought them up. Because of this autonomy, they seem to hold politicians hostage.
There are groups allied to politicians: politicians depend on these groups to fend off
opponents at a fee. Rapid mutation of groups, franchise of dreaded names, and cover
by politicians make it difficult to disband the groups. Very few residents are keen to
report them to the police for fear of reprisals. To some residents, ‘it is easier to avoid

36

Interview, Ministry of Information and Communications, March 23, 2009.
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trouble -- just pay and keep quiet’.37 Of concern is that the growing gang culture is a
serious threat to national security.
75.

From these findings, it is also clear that human rights defenders are under serious
threat. For this reason, there is an urgent need to address concerns over extrajudicial
killings and threats to human rights defenders, and to mobilise support for the
restoration of fundamental rights and liberties. Up to 20 human rights defenders are in
hiding fearing for their lives.

76.

A systematic strategy to disband illegal armed groups is long overdue. Such a strategy
must balance between the right to life for any individual, the due process that must be
followed, and popular demands by ordinary citizens to end the lives of such group
members. Extra-judicial killings, unfortunately, breed rather than reduce criminals
because they deal with the symptoms of a deeper problem.

37

Interview with business woman in Kibera, February 16, 2009.
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3.

AGENDA ITEM 2: ADDRESSING THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS,
PROMOTING NATIONAL HEALING AND RECONCILIATION

Background
77.

On February 4, 2008, the mediation team outlined measures to address the
humanitarian crisis and promote healing and reconciliation. Among these measures
were steps to assist and encourage displaced persons to return to their homes or to
new areas and to have safe passage and security. The parties were required to
provide adequate security and protection, particularly for vulnerable groups in the
camps, and provide basic services for the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). The
coalition partners were also required to provide information centres where the
affected could obtain information about the kind of assistance available to them and
how to access it.

78.

The mediation team called for the operationalisation of the Humanitarian Fund for
Mitigation of Effects and Resettlement of Victims of Post-2007 Election Violence
(Humanitarian Fund) by establishing a bipartisan, multi-sectoral board, with
streamlined procedures to disburse the funds. The mediation team also required
that victims of violence in urban areas not be neglected, and that food security be
prioritised by assisting displaced farmers to return to their farms to resume farming
activities.

79.

With regard to promoting reconciliation, healing and reconstruction, all party
leaders were required to convene joint rallies and ensure that freedom of
expression, press freedom and peaceful assembly were upheld as guaranteed in the
Constitution. All-inclusive reconciliation and peace-building committees were to be
established at the grassroots level, counselling support provided, and a resettlement
programme developed. The parties were also to welcome a UN High Commissioner
for Human Rights investigatory team, and establish a Truth, Justice and
Reconciliation Commission.

80.

This section of the report discusses progress made with respect to this agenda item.
The discussion examines:
(a) The resettlement programme;
(b) The nature of humanitarian assistance; and
(c) The measures to promote reconciliation and healing.
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Status of Implementation
Summary of findings
 Resettlement programme ended in December 2008 with 347,418 IDPs resettled
 Delivery of assistance to all official camps enabled through involvement of the
government, UN agencies, Kenya Red Cross, and NGOs as well as by use of a cluster
approach38
 All official camps have closed and been emptied of IDPs
 The UNHCR in collaboration with the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics completed
the IDP profiling exercise in July 2008. The result showed that there were 663,921 postelection IDPs
 108,000 IDPs have each received Ksh10,000 start-up funds from the Humanitarian
Fund
 23,110 have each received Ksh25,000 from the Humanitarian Fund for shelter
reconstruction.
 The government and partners in the Shelter Cluster have constructed 47,253 houses for
returning IDPs, mostly in Rift Valley, Western and Nyanza provinces
 The government and partners in the Early Recovery Cluster are supporting livelihoods
recovery projects, including revitalisation of agriculture and businesses through cash
voucher schemes, tools and building materials
 Newly registered IDPs mean new funds required. The Ministry of Special Programmes
has obtained a loan of Ksh1.7 billion from the African Development Bank and another
Ksh1.7 billion due to be released from Treasury in May 2009
 District Peace Committees established in all districts across Kenya; most of them are
functional
 Local level peace-building initiatives have started, supported by civil society
organisations and UN agencies
 Cluster coordination handed over from UN ‘lead’ agencies to pertinent government
ministries
 Revised Emergency Humanitarian Response Plan 2009 launched in March 2009

Resettlement Programme: Number and Situation of IDPs
81.

From the outset, humanitarian agencies identified a Cluster Approach as the
method for responding to the crisis. The Cluster Approach aimed at synergising
competencies and capacities of the various agencies and providing leadership in
different areas of competence among the agencies. The approach emphasised
partnership between the UN agencies, the International Red Cross and Red
Crescent Movement, international development partners and local NGOs. The
sectors/clusters included: camp coordination; early recovery and food security;
protection; nutrition; food aid; shelter; water and sanitation. This approach
suggests that some activities were of a short term nature while others were of a
medium and long-term nature.

82.

IDPs Are Neglected: Almost all official camps have closed, sometimes through use
of force. However, closure of camps has not translated into an end to displacement.

Cluster approach evolved as the modus operandi for the emergency response; it is a concept that
emphasised partnership between UN agencies, international NGOs and development partners, and the
government and local NGOs. Several sectors were established and lead agencies identified to provide
leadership and coordination in each ‘cluster’.

38
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Some IDPs remain in transit camps, or are integrated in communities. Others are at
other relocation sites without access to basic services or coordinated assistance. The
assumption that the problem of IDPs has ended simply because camps were closed
is erroneous; IDPs continue to face more challenges that are rarely brought to
public attention. The danger, however, lies in forgetting IDPs and failing to treat
their concerns with urgency. Given that the first wave of post-election violence in
the early 1990s led to the breeding of groups such as Mungiki, it is important that
IDPs’ problems be addressed satisfactorily.
83.

There are other problems around the IDP issue. One is that the actual number of
IDPs assisted through Operation Rudi Nyumbani is much lower than initial
estimates. Assistance was planned on the basis of an estimated figure of 350,000
IDPs in 296 camps.39 New figures based on an IDP profiling exercise by the Ministry
of Special Programmes, UNHCR and Kenya National Bureau of Statistics in
June/July 2008 showed a national tally of 663,921 IDPs, distributed as shown
below. These new figure suggest that the proportion of IDPs who received
humanitarian assistance, and on which planning was based, is less than what initial
figures showed.
Table 1: New figures on distribution of IDPs by regions
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Province
Nyanza
Western
Rift Valley
Central
Eastern
Coast
North Eastern
Nairobi
Total

Households
24,981
12,385
84,947
10,092
1,438
1,241
26
5,349
140,459

No. of individuals
118,547
58,677
408,631
46,959
6,769
4,774
148
19,416
663,921

Source: Ministry of Special Programmes, March 2009
84.

The second problem is that there are IDPs settled in other regions and in transit
camps who did not and do not receive coordinated support.40 There are many IDPs
settled in transit camps who have no access to assistance.41 Thirdly, there are
integrated IDPs who are rarely captured by conventional interventions. Findings
show that there are about 160,473 integrated IDPs. Assistance to this category of
persons was discontinued in March 2008 in readiness for the launch of the
Resettlement Programme in May 2008. Such a high number of IDPs has the effect
of creating social tension because of ‘compassion fatigue’ experienced by those
hosting them.

85.

Fourthly, the new IDPs are adding to the old caseloads of IDPs coming from the
1992/1993 and 1997/1998 political violence, and internal conflicts such as in the Mt
Elgon region. Old caseloads have not been attended to satisfactorily and, therefore,
are also compounding the IDP problem.

86.

These problems suggest that the measures taken to assist the IDPs are simply

United Nations, Kenya Humanitarian Response Plan (Revision), p1.
The humanitarian intervention concentrated in 25 districts in five provinces: Nairobi, Central, Rift
Valley, Western and Nyanza.
41 The Ministry of Special Programmes showed that by March 2009, there were 61 transit camps with over
40,000 IDPs in the Rift Valley. However, figures by CSOs showed that in Molo alone, there were 48 transit
camps with over 38,000 people.
39

40
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scratching the surface of the problem. The numbers are huge and their problems
continue to deepen. This raises a need for a comprehensive national response
framework on IDPs. These problems also demand that a policy addressing IDPs be
put in place as a matter of urgency but that it also be contextualised. The IDP crisis
is anchored on a broad social-political context. Sustainable solutions to the IDP
problem require attending to broader social-political reforms as elaborated in
Agenda Item 4, in particular.
87.

Besides displacements caused by the post-election violence, information from the
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Kenya office (OCHA-Kenya),
shows new forms of displacement emanating from resource conflicts in Northern
Kenya. In January and February 2009, 47 people were killed in pastoralist areas of
Northern Kenya. In January 2009, 44 per cent of deaths reported have resulted
from cattle-rustling. The other 56 per cent are from resource-based conflicts related
to land, pasture and water points. This is a 50 per cent increase from cases reported
in December 2008.42

Source: OCHA Humanitarian Update, Vol. 45 March 2009
88.

These new forms of conflict require immediate attention because they are not
mainstreamed in the IDP assistance programme. They are bound to increase with
worsening drought and poor pasture for livestock keepers. Cross-border cattle
raiding will also deepen the situation if past events are anything to go by.

Problem of Resettlement
89.

42

All the official camps except two have closed. There are no IDPs in camps that were
established during the post-election violence. Many IDPs have also been facilitated
to return to their farms and/or to build their homes. The closure of IDP camps
appears to have been done without adequate consultation with those affected. There
are several instances where IDPs complained about use of force by the government.
As recently as 16 April 2009, a group of IDPs camped at the Eldoret Show Ground
was forcibly evicted. Another group camped at Molo Saw Mill was forcibly dispersed

OCHA Kenya, Humanitarian Update, Vol. 43, p3.
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in March 2009. This implies that success in resettlement is sometimes judged on
the extent to which the camps are closed and IDPs cleared from the area.
90.

There are several reasons why some IDPs are in camps – including transit camps.
The survey shows that some fear being attacked while others are waiting for funds.
There are still some who do not have land and hope to get land for settlement.
Interestingly, only 9 per cent of the respondents believe increasing security will
promote returns. Also, only 10 per cent think promoting peace and reconciliation
will address the problem of displacement.
Figure 3: What are the most important reasons IDPs remain in camps?

Refused to
answer
Don’t Know
2%
3%
Other
IDPs aren't
2%
genuine
6%
They lack
land
23%

Fear of
attacks
39%

Awaiting
funds
25%

91.

Resettlement means one thing to the government (closing or absence of camps) and
another to the IDPs (sustainable return or integration). Further, both the
government and IDPs have different perspectives on the best approaches to
resettlement. The government is concerned about structural and material issues –
about success in disbursement of resettlement and reconstruction funds, regardless
of whether or not beneficiaries are able to find physical and material safety. On the
other hand, IDPs are concerned about their physical security and their well being.
IDPs are concerned about prospects for co-existence at the personal and community
level.

92.

The fragmented perception on the resettlement programme has resulted in the
government arguing that the IDPs are ‘undermining’ the resettlement programme
by misusing the funds they receive. They are seen as ‘dishonest’ because they have
refused to comply with the instruction to rebuild houses after receiving funds.
Others have refused to occupy the houses built for them by the government.43
However, according to them, the government and other aid agencies:

43

The Standard, March 12, 2009, ‘Government Says IDPs Undermining Resettlement’.
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‘didn’t ask what we wanted; personally I would have preferred
financial assistance to resettle wherever I wanted. We told some
NGOs we didn’t want houses, but the government insisted on
houses. They also didn’t ask our neighbours if it is alright for us to
come back … they are just forcing us to go back ... But going back is
not just about having a house, it is not that simple’.44
93.

The neighbours to IDPs have their views, too. In their view, the IDPs are being
pushed back without consultation with their erstwhile neighbours. In Molo, for
instance, a respondent from the non-displaced community remarked:
‘We fought, they went to the camp. We didn’t talk about anything
after that. These NGOs pass here on their way to the camp … But the
other day we saw people building houses for them and giving them
money to plough their farms. Then they call us for peace meetings.
We are waiting to see if they will occupy those houses.’45

94.

The remark above exposes a need for deeper dialogue between different
communities. No one should fault the strategy used to resettle the IDPs at this
stage. The critical point is what should be done to ensure tolerance,
accommodation, healing and reconciliation.

95.

Allegations of Non-Genuine IDPs in Camps: From the survey data, only 6 per cent
of the respondents said that those in camps are not genuine IDPs. However, local
narratives also indicate that there is a possibility that some people could be
capitalising on the IDP problem to obtain assistance. Those with this view believe it
is convenient to be in the camps because they avoid paying rent and other bills, and
benefit from food and non-food assistance from organisations and well-wishers. In
many return areas of the Rift Valley, for instance, those not displaced think IDPs are
‘pretending’ in order to continue receiving ‘free things’.46 According to a
government official in Naivasha, for instance:
‘Even after making sure all IDPs in the camps are resettled, we are
amazed to find new IDPs in the camp the following day. We wonder
where they come from!’47

96.

Factors that lead people into IDP camps – when they are not bona fide IDPs –
should concern policy makers. Poverty, unemployment and lack of livelihood
alternatives combine to create an environment not conducive to recovery and
economic stability for many poor people. Unless this environment is improved,
pushing IDPs out of sight will remain problematic.

Access to Relief and Assistance Funds
97.

By March 2009, the Ministry of Special Programmes had used about Ksh1.96 billion
of the resettlement kitty to resettle some 347,418 people through Operation Rudi
Nyumbani. According to data released in March 2009, a total of 108,000 IDPs had
received Ksh10,000 as start-up funds. Over 23,110 had received the Ksh25,000
shelter reconstruction funds. This resettlement fund is inadequate because of the
figure of estimated IDP population and the need to scale up planned operations.48

Interview with IDPs, Molo, March 2009
Interview, Molo, February 26, 2009.
46 Interview with a government official in Nairobi, March 2009.
47 Interview with Provincial Administration officer in Naivasha, March 3, 2009.
48 Interview with Resettlement Officer, Ministry of Special Programmes, March 18, 2009.
44
45
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In this regard, there are pledges of more funds to support IDPs.
98.

An important achievement is that IDPs in camps have received the start-up funds,
and a few others have received funds for shelter reconstruction. A survey of about
200 IDPs in a camp in Eldoret and in transit camps in Nakuru shows that as many
as 84 per cent received the start-up money. The survey of IDPs shows that the
Kenya Red Cross is the most likely source of assistance for those already in camps.
That is, if they have received assistance, it is most likely to have come from the
Kenya Red Cross (75 per cent), religious organisations (56 per cent), individuals (47
per cent) or the government (24 per cent).

99.

Assistance to IDPs has suffered several setbacks. Allegations of corruption in the
disbursement of funds, including money being given to non-IDPs as well as
complaints about forged lists of beneficiaries, genuine IDPs missing from lists, and
‘neglect’ of those not in camps are some of the most common problems. The Kenya
Anti Corruption Commission has begun investigations into these allegations. In the
survey of IDPs, 34 per cent pointed out ‘names missing from the lists’ as one
problem around disbursement. Other challenges include incorrect government
records (17 per cent), money given to non-IDPs (16 per cent), IDPs asked to pay
bribes (13 per cent) and missing documents (11 per cent), among other problems.

100.

Interviews at the district level revealed that the high mobility of IDPs has been a
major challenge to the disbursement of funds. Some IDPs claim not to have received
information on time because they had gone to see families or had gone to seek
employment. They also did not have information on how to make follow-ups.
Indeed, by March 2009, the Ministry of Special Programmes could not trace
beneficiaries of a total of Ksh37 million.

101.

These findings expose ineffective coordination between the various departments
supporting assistance efforts at the district level, and with the head offices in
Nairobi. They point at bottlenecks in communication and administration in the
programme.

102.

Findings also show that there are instances when non-IDPs have received funds
with the knowledge of officials. Such issues are not raised because the broad goal is
to promote peace and reconciliation, and officers at the local level feel that they
should not create an impression that only one community is receiving support.’49
While this may indeed promote reconciliation, the exclusion of genuine
beneficiaries might protract displacement and diminish the immediate positive
effects of the funds. In the survey, respondents were asked how disbursement could
be improved. Many IDPs pointed out the need to have transparent records (23 per
cent) while 16 per cent emphasised giving money to genuine IDPs. These issues
point to the need to ensure that transparent procedures are developed at the outset.
Again, a policy on how to deal with the resettlement of IDPs ought to address these
issues.
Trends in Healing and Reconciliation

103.

Post-election violence has ended, which is a positive sign. In many areas of the Rift
Valley, relations between IDPs and other people in the area are slowly normalising.
From the survey results, 43 per cent said that they are getting along well with other
communities while 16 per cent pointed at tensions but said there is no fighting.

49

Interviews in Burnt Forest in March 2009.
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However, IDPs face new threats although there are no major violent attacks
directed at them. As already mentioned, findings from field interviews show that
tension between IDPs and other communities tend to increase in consonance with
national level conflicts.
104.

The mediation agreement required the President and the Prime Minister, as well as
other political leaders, to promote healing and reconciliation by, among other
things, holding joint rallies, developing a national resettlement programme, deemphasising ethnicity, and establishing all-inclusive peace and reconciliation
committees. The agreement underlined the importance of establishing a Truth,
Justice and Reconciliation Commission.

105.

Progress has been made in passing relevant Bills in Parliament. The National
Cohesion and Integration Act, 2008 became operational on March 9, 2009
following a Kenya Gazette Notice of March 2, 2009. The Truth, Justice and
Reconciliation Commission Act also became operational in the same period.

106.

Interviews with different respondents reveal a disconnect between what people at
the local level and national elites expect from the various pieces of legislation and
policies following from the KNDR process. Ordinary citizens focus on improvement
of social-economic and security conditions while elites at the national level are
concerned about how these instruments can address issues of rights.50 This
disconnect, therefore, is about prioritization of measures rather than differences of
what should or should not be done.

Peace-Building Activities
107.

The government and NGOs are undertaking peace-building activities. A majority of
Kenyans living in post-election violence areas report that there have been activities
aimed at promoting healing and reconciliation. In the survey, 37 per cent of the
respondents said these activities were peace meetings and workshops while another
14 per cent said the activities included religious crusades, sports and games (7 per
cent) and counselling (6 per cent). There are others who cited awareness creation (8
per cent) and women initiatives (4 per cent). About 21 per cent reported that no
activities had taken place in these areas. This last response is a point of concern as it
indicates that peace building is not widely spread or that a significant number of
people are not aware of such initiatives. This demands a strengthening of strategies
to build peace and reconcile communities.

Wachira, George and Kamungi, Prisca (2008), The TRC As Transitional Justice Model in Africa:
Emerging Lessons and Implications for Post-Accord Societies. Nairobi: NPI-Africa.
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Figure 4: How successful are the efforts at promoting healing and reconciliation among
communities in your area?
Don’t know
1%
Not
successiful
6%

Refused to
answer
2%

Very
successiful
33%

Somewhat
successiful
58%

108.

In addition to initiatives by various agencies, the findings show that senior
politicians are now increasingly involved in peace initiatives more so than in the last
quarter of 2008. Senior politicians have been holding joint rallies where they
emphasise reconciliation and healing. For instance, in March 2009, the Minister for
Agriculture and several MPs from Rift Valley launched ‘Operation Karibu
Nyumbani’ (Welcome Back Home) to receive returning IDPs.51 Before this period,
the Vice President had launched ‘Operation Ujirani Mwema’ (Good
Neighbourliness) while the Ministry of Special Programmes had launched
‘Operation Tujenge Pamoja’ (Lets Build together). Reconstruction of destroyed
homes, however, had begun to cause resentment among the local communities. In
some areas, the local communities began talking about ‘Operation Zuia Madoadoa’
(Prevent the Return of the Stained), which halted the pace of healing and
reconciliation.

109.

During the period under review, a peace building initiative in Burnt-Forest
proposed to change the name of the town to ‘Tarakwa’ to symbolise a departure
from a culture of intolerance and arson. In general, the period between February
and March 2009 has witnessed more peace-building meetings than was the case in
the previous year. Former President Daniel Moi has been leading some of these
initiatives.52

110.

Politicians and religious leaders are not viewed equally in terms of influencing
healing and reconciliation. Asked which people have the greatest influence in
promoting healing and reconciliation, 51 per cent of the respondents said religious
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leaders while 31 per cent cited politicians. As few as 8 per cent identified, separately,
NGOs and the provincial administration. This points to a need to increase the use of
religious leaders and – to some extent – politicians in peace-building initiatives
rather than relying on the provincial administration. The poor response on the
provincial administration testifies to possible lack of moral authority on their part
to lead healing and reconciliation. It is possible that people think that NGOs lack a
proper grasp of local dynamics that drive inter-group tensions, hence few believe
that they can influence change.
111.

These responses notwithstanding, the findings show that people are certain about
which measures to adopt to promote healing and reconciliation. Of those
interviewed, 22 per cent said ending tribalism is one important way to do so, while
another 15 per cent think that more jobs for the poor will lead to reconciliation. A
further 14 per cent want those responsible for violence to be tried, 12 per cent want
a TJRC while 11 per cent want a new land policy.

112.

On the basis of these findings, therefore, it is argued here that nothing short of
comprehensive reforms will heal and reconcile various communities. Eradicating
‘tribalism’, addressing inequalities, promulgating a new land policy, and
prosecuting perpetrators of violence are issues that require not a single measure but
a comprehensive reform of institutions and structures that drive the economy and
politics in Kenya.

Kenyan Refugees in Uganda
113.
In April 2008, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) reported that 12,000 Kenyans had fled the post-election violence in January
200853 and gone to Uganda. The Government of Uganda (GoU) and UNHCR
received about 2500 Kenyans at Mulanda Transit Centre, about 20km from
Tororo.54 They were given refugee status in Uganda. In May 2008 and following a
verification exercise by the government of Uganda and UNHCR, the government
relocated them to Kiryadongo Refugee Settlement site in Masindi district, about
230km Northwest of Kampala. At present the refugees are in about six different
settlement sites in Uganda. The Kiryandong site is the largest, with 1800 Kenyan
refugees.
114.

The majority of these refugees are from the Kikuyu ethnic community evicted from
Western Kenya but there are few others from other ethnic communities. The poor
conditions in which IDPs in Kenya live in and use of force in closing IDP camps
deter them from returning to Kenya. They feel their security and human dignity is
not guaranteed.

115.

The Kenyan refugees were issued with about half an acre of land to put up their
shelter. They were also put on 100% food ration. Those who demonstrated ability to
cultivate more were given additional land. Some have expanded their plots to about
five acres. Refugees have formed a farmers’ cooperative society and plan to diversify
their activities.

116.

Social relations amongst Kenyans are cordial. However, relations with refugees
from Southern Sudan are strained. Although source of this tension is not clear,
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there are those who observe that tension began when Kenyans did not receive their
food ration at the time they arrived. The Sudanese began accusing them of stealing
their food crops and fruits. But Kenyans are seen as relatively more aware of the
Uganda Refugee Act and tend to demand their rights from humanitarian agencies.
Other people see them as difficult and as having a ‘know-it-all’ attitude.
117.

Interviews with the refugees reveal that many prefer to stay in Uganda. There is
peace; land is plenty; and there is no dispute over the land they have been given.
They can farm and engage in livelihood activities without fear of disruption or loss
of property. There are also some who fear that they will be prosecuted for taking
part in post-election violence.

118.

The refugees in Uganda feel that the government of Kenya has neglected them. They
are worried that the government has forgotten them because they are not aware of
any effort to assist them to return back to Kenya and no one ever visits them. They
are worried that the rapid repatriation of Southern Sudanese refugees will lead to
the exit of NGOs from the camp and to eventual neglect of Kenyans.

CONCLUSIONS
119.

Through Operation Rudi Nyumbani, the government facilitated the return of IDPs
who had land. Many others have received financial assistance from the
Humanitarian Fund to start up their lives and reconstruct their homes.
Nonetheless, the humanitarian crisis facing IDPs is not yet over. IDPs are living in
transit camps where they have no access to basic services. Furthermore, many
continue to face threats of eviction every time national elites are in conflict or
disagree. The fundamental causes of conflict and inter-ethnic mistrust remain
unaddressed and continue to hinder the achievement of sustainable peace in return
areas.

120.

Peace committees have been established from provincial to the village level and
NGOs are supporting peace initiatives. In spite of this, IDPs continue to receive
threats of eviction. This suggests that the problem is intertwined with broader
national social-economic and political problems. The IDP question cannot be
addressed successfully in the absence of comprehensive reforms envisaged under
Agenda Item 4 of the KNDR.

121.

Healing and reconciliation are also intertwined with national political processes.
During the period under review, there was more visibility for politicians in healing
and reconciliation meetings. Their presence in many events adds a voice to calls for
cohesion and unity among local communities. However, their approach is ad hoc; it
is not part of a policy framework. There is a need for a broad policy framework that
establishes linkages between high level or national and local level healing and
reconciliation strategies.

122.

Healing and reconciliation requires political leadership and cannot be left to faithbased and other civil society organisations at the grassroots level. And to provide
national direction, it is critical that the two principals form groups to mobilise
people at the national and grassroots level towards reconciliation. Healing and
reconciliation should be treated as a national political priority. Policies may be
required to spell out this urgency.
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4.
AGENDA ITEM 3: RESOLVING THE POLITICAL CRISIS (POWER
SHARING)
Background
123.

Both parties in the mediation, Government/PNU and ODM, signed the Agreement
on the Principles of Partnership of the Coalition Government on February 28, 2008.
Both parties agreed that neither side could effectively govern the country without
the other. They thus agreed to ‘real power sharing’ to move the country forward and
begin the healing and reconciliation process. This Agreement led to the enactment
of the National Accord and Reconciliation Act of 2008, which effectively established
a Grand Coalition Government.

124.

The mediation team and the parties involved recognised that the crisis revolved
around issues of power and the functioning of State institutions.55 It also noted that
resolving the crisis required adjustments to the law, and in particular amendment of
the constitution to provide for formation of a coalition government including a
Prime Minister with powers to supervise and coordinate government affairs.

125.

This section of the report discusses the performance of the Grand Coalition
Government. The discussion focuses on the following indicators, which are used to
track progress on this agenda item:
(a) Distribution of public sector positions;
(b) Political cohesion in the coalition;
(c) Coherence in decision making; and
(d) Conflict management within the coalition government.

Status of Implementation
Summary of findings
 Signing of the agreement restored calm but every time there are conflicts in the
coalition, animosity grows among communities at the local level
 Grand Coalition comprises equitable sharing of Cabinet positions
 How to share other public sector positions has caused divisions in the Grand
Coalition
 Continuing disagreements among Cabinet Ministers creates an impression of a
‘two-governments-in-one’ situation
 A Permanent Committee to manage affairs of the coalition is in place
 How to manage ‘power sharing’ has implications for all the agenda items; conflicts
have potential to threaten implementation of Agenda 4, including putting the
constitution review off the rails
 Commissions of inquiry have been established and undertaken tasks as outlined in
the KNDR

55 Agenda Item 3: How to resolve the political crisis, annotated agenda prepared by Kenya
National Dialogue and Reconciliation Committee.

30

The Context of Coalition Governments and Power Sharing
126.

The formation of coalitions and sharing of political power has provoked endless
debate not only in Africa but also in the developed world. The main question
addressed in this debate is how to bring about political stability, especially in postconflict situations and/or in culturally fragmented societies. Part of this debate
stresses the importance of ‘consociational’ arrangements in which power is shared
among the various groups in the society. However, leading authorities on this
subject emphasise that power sharing is undertaken simultaneously with the
practice of proportional representation in the electoral system.56 Devolution is also
introduced to give various groups a sense of autonomy.

127.

There are other conditions required for power sharing to bring about sustainable
stability: elites must be prepared to accommodate opposition view-points. They
must be prepared to transcend ethnic differences in order to work together. More
often than not, power sharing is introduced because neither of the elites can govern
without the other. Unity of purpose is critical in this regard. This purpose is usually
focused on implementation of policies essential for the stability of the country.

128.

Kenya’s Coalition Government was, therefore, established not as an end in itself but
as a means to an end. It was established to allow for reforms, including those that
would address the fundamental causes of the crisis. The Coalition Government was
meant to create conditions for political stability to allow for broad reforms in order
to avert a recurrence of violence.

129.

One important achievement of establishing the Coalition Government has been
restoration of calm in places that experienced post-election violence. Immediately
after the signing of the agreement on the establishment of the Coalition
Government, there was calm in all parts of the country. One disturbing finding,
however, is that internal conflicts in the coalition are finding their way to the local
level.

130.

The previous report pointed out that parties in the coalition are interpreting the
National Accord and Reconciliation Act from their own points of view. There are
multiple interpretations of various provisions. The different interpretations of the
National Accord are leading to conflicts, which could spill over to the constitutional
review process and prevent the promulgation of a new constitution. Furthermore,
negative ethnicity, the fulcrum on which Kenya’s politics revolves, will feed into the
reform process and complicate the realisation of comprehensive reforms.

Distribution of Power and Sharing of Public Sector Positions
131.

From the outset, controversies about payoffs beset power-sharing discussions.
Although Cabinet positions were shared equally, the discussion about which party
would get which ministry denigrated the goal of power-sharing and the National
Accord. In many ways, the discussion about ministries showed that both parties
were concerned about payoffs; they were keen on accessing opportunities. Nothing
demonstrates this more than the symbols used to articulate their positions. Some

Lijphart, Arend (1969), ‘Consociational Democracy’. World Politics, 21, 2: 207-225; Lijphart,
Arend (2004), ‘Constitutional Design for Divided Societies’ in Journal of Democracy Volume
15:2: 96-108; Reynolds, Andrew, Ed. (2002). The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional
Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy. London: Oxford University Press.
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argue that they got a half a loaf of bread, which was not enough to share. Others
argue that they shared equally their share of the bread, and so on. This on its own
tends to deepen the culture of political patronage and may transform into obstacles
for undertaking reforms.
132.

A problematic start: The point here is not to belittle either argument or position by
either of the two parties. The general focus of this debate is more on access to
patronage resources than on laying a foundation to inform comprehensive reforms.
An issue of concern is that sharing power in the coalition is being analysed through
the prism of ethnic and sub-ethnic groups -- some are keen to see which group won
or lost, and so on.57 Appointments to the public service are being seen and
contextualised in this manner.58

133.

These arguments are generally straining the reform endeavours. They have the
effect of ethnicising the process to undertake reforms. Already, discussions about
staffing of various Commissions that have been established under the KNDR show a
tendency towards ethnic considerations. Regional representation, a factor that has
informed appointment to some Commissions, is one exemplification of this trend.
Good or bad, ethnic representation and consideration in appointments to these
Commissions is, simply put, a problematic beginning for a country seeking cohesion
and unity. It has the effect of slowing the pace of re-establishing sound governance
structures.
Working Together?

134.

A successful Coalition Government requires that elites work together and appreciate
the importance of transcending their differences. It requires that they build trust
among themselves and consult each other in making decisions. The last report
noted that the relationship between the President and the Prime Minister was
reported to be cordial; they were reportedly consulting regularly on many issues.

135.

In the period between March and April 2009, however, media reports showed
strained relations between not only the two Principals but also between the
politicians in both parties. In March, for instance, ODM raised a need for renegotiation of the National Accord, arguing that power was not equally shared. In
April, the Prime Minister pointed out that he was not being consulted in making key
decisions.59 Both parties sought to address these challenges through the Permanent
Committee on the Management of the Coalition. The Committee’s attempt to jointly
discuss the affairs of the coalition failed when both parties disagreed on the agenda
for a meeting convened in early April 2009. With the failure of the meeting,
divisions widened following accusations and counter-accusations on who was
responsible for the failed meeting. Both parties began taking extreme positions in
defence of their arguments.

136.

These conflicts have affected how the public views the performance of the
government. In the survey conducted in post-election violence areas, 21 per cent of
the respondents said that the Coalition Government works together while 77 per
cent thought it does not work together. Also only 39 per cent are satisfied about the
working relationship between the President and the Prime Minister; 59 per cent are

‘Intrigues in Grand Coalition Have More to Do with Future than Past,’ The Standard March
15, 2009.
58 ibid
59 “Raila: Kibaki Tells My Juniors to Disrespect Me,” East African Standard, April 4, 2009.
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dissatisfied. This political tension has impacted negatively on perceptions of power
sharing within the coalition, with 54 per cent of respondents in our survey believing
that the Prime Minister is not exercising his powers of office.
137.

These findings must be read against the tensions in the Coalition Government and
demands and counter-demands for power or even demands for clarification of
various roles and responsibilities in the new structure of political power. It is
difficult to articulate any recommendation or give a final word on how these
differences can be resolved. However, borrowing from the growing literature on
power sharing, it is important that the elites recognise the perils of their not
working together. It is important that they transcend their ethnic and other
cleavages and project to the nation an image of a united government rather than
‘two-governments-in-one’. If unchecked, the political rhetoric between and among
the coalition parties threatens to plunge the country back into chaos. It is important
for political leaders – and not the two principals only – to develop a culture of
tolerance and guide the country through the constitutional review process, the main
hope for a new beginning.

138.

Similar to the last quarter of 2008, conflict between the Office of the Prime Minister
and the Office of the Head of the Civil Service and Secretary to the Cabinet
continued to generate internal tension within the coalition. The ODM continued
demanding that the office of Head of Civil Service be placed under the Prime
Minister’s office in order to fully recognise the premier’s role of coordinating and
supervising government ministries.60 PNU on the other hand asserts that the role of
Head of Civil Service is clearly spelt out in the Constitution and there is no conflict
with the Office of the Prime Minister.

139.

The survey in the post-election violence areas sought to see how this has affected
popular perceptions on the effectiveness of the Prime Minister. Specifically, asked
whether the Prime Minister was exercising his powers of office, 54 per cent said ‘No’
while 34 per cent said ‘Yes’. Among those who said ‘No’, some (10 per cent) said he
had not fulfilled his pledges and another 9 per cent said he had no powers.
Table 2: Why do you think Prime Minister Odinga is/is not exercising his powers of
office?

He has not fulfilled pledges

10%

He has brought development

10%

He has no powers

9%

There are other influential people in the government

8%

Kibaki is still very powerful

8%

He is uniting Kenyans

4%

He supervises government ministries

3%

Reduced Corruption

3%

Other

34%

Don’t know

11%

‘Make Muthaura Work Under Raila, Says ODM’, Daily Nation, January 6, 2009, p1.61 See
Principles of Partnership of the Coalition Government signed on February 28, 2008.
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140.

These figures and the general findings from the survey reveal that conflicts in the
coalition are entrenching perceptions that are not supportive of reform efforts.
Recognising that perceptions are critical in post-violence situations, the main
challenge is how to undo these perceptions and create an enabling environment for
reforms. Creating the correct perception requires doing the ‘right things right’ when
opportunities present themselves. Legal and political interpretations of the National
Accord are responsible for the tensions in the coalition. The law was changed to end
the political crisis; the political crisis itself led to restructuring of the constitution.
There is bound, therefore, to be differences in interpreting what should supersede
the other. Lessons learnt from these debates and tension in the coalition must
inform the drafting of the new constitution and other reforms that are under way.

141.

In general, disagreements on power sharing have been a source of instability in the
Coalition government. This has been due to the fact that both parties want to
interpret the National Accord to their advantage. But both parties should appreciate
that power sharing and the coalition itself were crafted as temporary measures. To
move forward, both parties should begin emphasizing fast-tracking of the
constitution review where some of these issues can be effectively addressed.
Sharing of Public Sector Positions

142.

Establishing a grand coalition is often followed by discussions about payoffs or
sharing of positions. Power sharing in coalition arrangements thus sometimes leads
to political parties adopting different strategies to maximise their gains in the
coalition government. In Kenya, so far, emphasis has been on how the benefits
(mostly positions) would be shared among the coalition partners. Disagreements
over payoffs have assumed greater importance over policy issues and have
themselves slowed the pace of reforms.

143.

The provision from which the multiple interpretations follow is that ‘the
composition of the coalition government shall at all times reflect the relative
parliamentary strength of the respective parties and shall at all times take into
account the principle of portfolio balance.’61 Some argue that the public service,
parastatal and diplomatic jobs were to be shared among the coalition partners.
Others argue that these (civil service) posts cannot be distributed on the basis of
political affiliation because “this will not only politicise the civil service but also
cause divisions in the bureaucracy.’62

144.

This debate must be settled to allow for cohesion in the coalition. Both parties and
elites leading these debates must realise that power sharing is about relinquishing
some control by those who have it to those who do not have it. Power sharing is
about recognising that you cannot enjoy total power if those in conflict decide to put
their differences aside to pull the nation together. Since the key principle in power
sharing arrangements is consensus and unity of purpose, the two principals should
consult and provide a solution to end this debate. If left to the many interpretations
currently obtaining, disagreements over sharing of public sector positions are likely
to continue and further undermine the coalition.

61

See Principles of Partnership of the Coalition Government signed on February 28, 2008.
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145.

The disagreement about power sharing within the coalition appears to be spreading
into government ministries. Notably, on January 15, 2009, the government
announced diplomatic and parastatal appointments63 but an Assistant Minister in
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dismissed the appointments as a “sham,” arguing
that they were “political and not diplomatic” and did not consider gender or party
equity, and neither was the Prime Minister consulted on them.64 Appointments to
the parastatals during the same period also raised concern over consultation.65

146.

Patrimonial politics seem to drive both parties. The more they discuss how they are
losing or gaining, the more they forget that the National Accord had the goal of
facilitating far reaching reforms. While the National Accord is meant to provide
conditions for addressing national cohesion, it is producing contradictions that run
counter to this objective.
Level of Political Cohesion

147.

A Coalition Government whose mandate is to facilitate reforms to prevent political
instability requires a greater degree of political and administrative cohesion. Inter
and intra-party cohesion and coordination are critical for agreeing on policies to
guide the government.

148.

There is lack of political cohesion at different levels of the government.
Disagreements and demands for power have spilled into policy making and
spawned policy and political immobility. Parliament was recalled on 20 January
2009 to enact laws to establish the Special Tribunal to try perpetrators of postelection violence and to appoint Commissioners to the Interim Independent
Electoral Commission (IIEC), among others. But Parliament failed on both counts.

149.

While several factors contributed to the failure of Parliament to pass the
Constitutional Amendment Bill to pave way for the establishment of the Tribunal, it
is important to observe that inter- and intra-party divisions – sometimes along
ethnic lines – contributed to the manner in which MPs voted. PNU comprised the
majority of those who supported initial nominees to the IIEC, while ODM had the
majority against ratifying the nominees. Inter- and intra-party divisions again
played out during voting for the establishment of the Special Tribunal. Within PNU,
50 voted ‘for’ and another 42 voted ‘against’. A similar pattern of voting emerged
within ODM: 51 voted ‘for’ and 49 voted ‘against’. The Constitutional Amendment
Bill could not be passed. And when time came to pick the members to the IIEC,
‘different political contestations in Parliament took precedence over formation of
the IIEC.’66 The list of initial nominees had to be taken back to the nominating
committee.

150.

Inter- and intra-party divisions, therefore, have the consequence of delaying
formulation of policies to steer reforms. They can cause both political and policy
immobility and if not addressed, they can easily lead to a policy gridlock. While the
Political Parties Act can play some role in institutionalising the political parties and,
therefore, foster internal coherence, the Coalition Government will have to develop

‘Former MPs Named in New Diplomatic Line-up’, Daily Nation January 16, 2009 pg 5
“ODM cries foul over appointments,” Standard January 25 2009 pg 28
65 ‘ODM cries fouls over appointments,’ Standard January 25 2009 pg 28
66 Remarks by a Cabinet Minister during a public forum on power sharing in ethnically divided
societies, February 2009.
63

64
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a legally binding framework to manage its internal affairs. This issue has been
covered in the previous report as well.
151.

The continued disagreement between PNU and ODM only reinforces the perception
of an incoherent government and is undermining the reform process. In postelection violence areas, 77 per cent of the respondents interviewed believe the
Coalition Government does not work well together. And to achieve required
harmony, 20 per cent think the partners need to have unity within political parties
while 11 per cent suggest the coalition parties should resolve their differences.

152.

Asked about what is the most important thing that the Coalition Government can do
to work well together, about 20 per cent of the respondents said unity within
political parties would facilitate this.
Table 3 : What is the most important thing that the Coalition government can do to
work well together

Unity within political parties

20%

Solve differences

11%

Fight corruption

7%

Focus on the interests of the public

6%

Create more jobs

5%

Renegotiate power-sharing

4%

Reconciliation

4%

Reduce the price of goods

4%

Other
No response

34%
5%

153.

Another reason slowing the pace in undertaking reforms is politicians’ interest in
preparing for their 2012 General Election campaigns. To some of the people
interviewed, political elites have ignored reforms in favour of their 2012 election
campaigns”.67 For this reason, those with presidential ambitions and/or those
supporting particular candidates tend to scrutinise reforms to find the implications
for their political ambitions. Thus, reforms and political ambitions of individual
politicians are competing; and reform has to give way. In the view of a former
Cabinet minister, how to resolve this competition is a major challenge because it has
slowed the reform momentum present in February 2008 when the Accord was
signed.68

154.

A point to emphasise here is that the divisions witnessed within the parties and
within the Coalition Government have a basis in how power is shared. They are also
the result of absence of other institutional arrangements to support the power

Interview with a civil society key informant, February 2009.
Remarks by a Cabinet minister during a public forum on power sharing in ethnically divided
societies, February 2009.
67

68
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sharing agreement that came into place to end the political crisis. The First-Pastthe-Post majoritarian electoral system practised in Kenya – and one that provides
for a winner-take-all system – has shaped or contributed to these divisions. In this
regard, the country has to rethink its electoral system.
155.

Ethnicity and ethnic constituencies drive these divisions, too. There is need to
carefully design a framework to address issues around ethnic inequalities and their
implications for political stability. While legislative approaches have already been
undertaken in this regard, political reforms will be required to change behaviour
and practice in this area.

Coherence in Decision-Making
156.

In order to enhance coherence and stability, a coalition needs to develop and
maintain unity and trust among the different partners. There is need for cohesion at
both the level of policy and administration. Political cohesion must be reflected in
administrative actions. However, in the period between January and April 2009,
ministers tended to issue contradictory statements. At other times, their statements
reinforced the perception that the Grand Coalition is a ‘two-governments-in-one’.
For instance, the government gave uncoordinated responses to the report by the UN
Special Rapporteur on Extra-Judicial Executions. The Justice Minister said parts of
the report would be implemented while the Foreign Affairs Minister said the
government was not taking a formal position until it had read and scrutinised the
report.69 Speaking ahead of the release of the report, the Prime Minister had
expressed the government’s commitment to implement the report in full. On the
other hand, the Government spokesperson issued a statement saying that the
government was totally rejecting the report.

157.

Other instances have reinforced the perception of a ‘two-governments-in-one’. The
Minister for Medical Services and the Minister for Public Health and Sanitation
have been involved in a struggle for control of key departments, which has affected
service delivery.70 This struggle is compromising service provision.71 Efforts to
harmonise operations between the two ministries have been hampered by technical
challenges, since both ministries were closely linked and sometimes had
overlapping duties.72

158.

The contradictory statements from members of the same government not only
create confusion among the public but also perpetuate the perception of two
governments in one. We acknowledge that there will always be differences of
opinion within a coalition of this nature, but this should be all the more reason why
there must be consultation at every turn.

Conflict Management within the Coalition
159.

Rivalries and differences among politicians have also generated friction within the
coalition, which has tended to impair service delivery and efficiency of dispute
resolution mechanisms put in place. This is especially so when members of the
conflict resolution mechanisms are the ones fighting.

“Ministers Split over Police Death Squads,” Daily Nation, February 27, 2009, p9.
‘Split of Ministry Behind Poor Service Delivery,’ The Standard, April 3, 2009.
71 Ibid.
72 Telephone interview with a Senior Director at the Ministry of Medical Services.
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160.

On January 15, 2009, the coalition partners established a Permanent Committee on
management of the Coalition Government, with each party having seven
representatives.73 The key pointer from this dispute-resolution committee is how
determined the principals are for the coalition to work. However, the Permanent
Committee also faces a challenge of resolving open disagreements among its
members. Attempts to resolve disputes have not been very successful.

161.

Four elements have been attributed to be the source of constant conflict in the
Coalition Government.74 One is lack of discipline in the coalition “since there are no
rules to govern the players”. Secondly, and related to this, according to one
minister, is due to weak structures to govern the coalition. A third source of conflict
is lack of transparency and accountability of the political class, and finally the
challenge of resolving competing political interests within the coalition.

162.

While it is just one step towards stabilising the coalition, the committee needs to be
made effective by having a written framework of engagement signed by its
members. There have been some positive comments on the contents of the initial
draft prepared in May 2008, which need to be taken into account. In the absence of
an agreement, conflict will intensify and spill into the reform process.

163.

So far, the Permanent Committee to manage the affairs of the coalition has not
given guidelines on resolving constant conflict within it. It is vital that the
committee is re-energised to give parliamentarians a platform to thrash out their
differences ahead of important policy debates. Lack of such an avenue for building
consensus could be partly responsible for the problems that the Coalition
Government is encountering within and outside Parliament.
Level of Satisfaction with the Coalition Government

164.

Public satisfaction and support for the Grand Coalition has fallen to very low levels
one year after its formation. The low scores result from Kenyans feeling that their
immediate needs are not being addressed. The feeling is that the Coalition
Government has moved ahead with its agenda, leaving the citizenry behind and thus
creating public resentment. The citizenry see the government “as a mechanism for
covering up mega-corruption among the political elite.”75

165.

Among the people we surveyed, 33 per cent thought members of their community
would support the dissolution of the Coalition Government while 25 per cent said
they would demonstrate against such dissolution. Everyday problems of high
inflation, hunger, high oil prices, among others affect people of all ethnic
communities regardless of their political affiliation. Therefore, the perception that
the Coalition Government is doing nothing to mitigate people’s problems could be
attributed to the high percentage of respondents who would support its break-up.

166.

Reluctance to carry out comprehensive reforms, demobilisation of illegal armed
groups and national healing and reconciliation is a ticking bomb. If the Coalition
Government were to break up, 22 per cent of respondents said they would commit
acts of violence against other communities. However, due to the feeling that only
the political elite are benefiting from the Coalition Government, this might turn out

73

Initial composition overlooked gender representation. The Committee was expanded probably to take
account of this.
74 Observations by a Cabinet minister at a public forum to discuss power sharing in ethnically
divided societies, February 2009.
75 Interview with a resident of Uasin Gishu District, January 2009.
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to be a class conflict. As one key informant noted, “a Luo and Kikuyu both suffer the
same hunger pangs; they lack the same amount of money to buy unga (flour) and
they both know who is stealing from their coffers. Next time they will not look at
their ethnic identity because they know the hunger is due to poor leadership and
corruption, and not drought.”76
167.

As far as the coalition partners are concerned, ODM seems not to be completely
happy in the government. On a number of occasions, in the last quarter, ODM
leaders have spoken of their frustrations in the Grand Coalition and how it had
slowed down their party’s agenda.77 The party has also raised concerns over being
treated as “junior partners” by their PNU counterparts but says it will not leave the
coalition.78 PNU rarely complains of similar issues but dares ODM to leave
government if they are not satisfied.79

168.

Feelings of discontent by ODM and allegations of being treated like “junior
partners” is a key threat to the reform process and passage of Bills in Parliament.
Once one coalition partner is unhappy with the operation and the effectiveness of
power sharing, its members individually or collectively may be tempted to start
informal negotiations with another party in order to seek a better deal, even if it is
in office with its coalition partner. With this, the government is not guaranteed total
support for its legislation.

CONCLUSION
169.

The power sharing agreement appears to have acted as a ceasefire. Although it is a
necessary arrangement for ending political violence, it is not sufficient for ending
Kenya’s political difficulties. It is creating political conflicts among the elites. These
conflicts, in turn, affect people’s views on the government. One lesson learnt is that
power sharing requires some other arrangements, such as devolved system of
government and proportional representation, to stabilise political institutions and
politics. Otherwise, the winner-takes-all approach could ignite another cycle of
violence.

170.

Lack of internal coherence and continuing conflicts in the coalition are reinforcing
the image of the government as a ‘two-governments-in-one’. Confidence in
government and general satisfaction with the performance of the government is
continually declining because of these perceptions. Furthermore, these conflicts are
an obstacle to healing and reconciliation at the local level.

Interview with Retired PCEA leader and NCCK council member, March 2009.
“All Is Not Lost, ODM Tells Supporters,” The Standard, February 17, 2009; “Party Not to
Blame for Poor Performance, Rails Claims,” The Standard, February 17, 2009.
78 “ODM: We Are Unhappy with the Coalition Partner’s Conduct,” The Standard January 5,
2009.
79 “PNU Rejects Demands on Coalition,” Daily Nation, March 5, 2009, pg 40
76
77
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5.

AGENDA ITEM 4: LONG-STANDING ISSUES AND SOLUTIONS

BACKGROUND
171.

The parties to the mediation process and the Panel of Eminent African Personalities
recognised several underlying issues that had caused the crisis in Kenya. If left
unaddressed, these issues pose a threat to the very existence of Kenya as a unified
country. The mediation process formulated Agenda Item 4 as a framework for
undertaking coherent and far-reaching reforms to specifically address the root
causes of recurrent conflict and create a better, more secure and prosperous Kenya
for all.

172.

The long-standing issues identified under Agenda Item 4 were:
(a) undertaking constitutional, legal and institutional reforms;
(b) undertaking land reforms;
(c) tackling poverty and inequality, and combating regional development
imbalances;
(d) tackling unemployment, especially among the youth;
(e) consolidating national cohesion and unity; and
(f) addressing transparency, accountability and impunity.

173.

This section discusses progress made in implementing each of these components in
the period between January and April 2009.

STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION

Summary of findings
a) Constitutional, Legal and Institutional Reforms
Constitutional
•

Legislation to jumpstart the constitutional review process has been enacted.
A Committee of Experts has been appointed to spearhead the review process
under the new law. The Committee has taken office and is scheduled to roll
out its work plan

Institutional
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•

The Judiciary has finalised and launched its 2009-2012 Strategic Plan to
address the institution’s image and restore public confidence in it. New Civil
Procedure rules to simplify court processes and enhance case management
are expected to be adopted

•

Recommendations to set up a gender taskforce within the police force and
streamline recruitment and training of officers are being implemented

•

A new public service superannuation contributory pension scheme has been
launched. Retirement age for civil servants raised from 55 to 60 years

•

Parliament has adopted new Standing Orders and is implementing them.

b) Land Reforms
•

The government is recovering illegally or irregularly allocated tracts of land
and compiling a draft National Land Use Management policy

c) Poverty, Inequality and Regional Imbalances
•

Progress is being made to implement Vision 2030. Rules for public-private
partnership have been gazetted.

d) Unemployment Particularly among the Youth
•

The government has launched the Kazi Kwa Vijana programme and
developed a Marshall Plan for equipping youth with skills

e) Consolidating National Cohesion and Unity
•

The National Cohesion and Integration Act, 2008 has come into force

•

Process to establish TJRC initiated and list of nominees presented to the
Parliament

f) Transparency, Accountability and Impunity
•

Investigations of corruption allegations have resulted in the suspension
and/or dismissal of some government officials

Undertaking Constitutional, Legal and Institutional Reforms
a) Constitutional Reforms
174.

The mediation agreement outlined essential steps for the attainment of a new
constitution. The Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act, 2008 and the
Constitutional Review Act, 2008 also reinforced these steps:
(a) Parliament to enact a Review Statute, including a timetable;
(b) Parliament to enact a referendum law;
(c) A Draft Constitution to be prepared in a consultative process with expert
assistance;
(d) Parliament to approve the Draft Constitution; and
(e) Kenyans to enact a new Constitution through a referendum.

Progress towards constitutional reform
175.
Constitutional Review Laws: In December 2008, the constitutional review process
kicked off with the enactment of the Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act, 2008
and the Constitutional Review Act, 2008. The laws were enacted about three
months later than anticipated, implying that the review process is already behind
schedule.
176.

The laws have gaps and discrepancies that could invite unnecessary litigation. For
instance, the Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act, 2008 provides for the
Interim Independent Electoral commission (IIEC) as the body to supervise the
referendum while the Constitution of Kenya Review Act refers to the Electoral
Commission of Kenya. The Review Act, 2008 refers to the High Court and not the
Interim Independent Constitutional Dispute Resolution Court envisaged by the
Constitution of Kenya Amendment Act, 2008. The deletion of the Fourth Schedule
41

of this law, which contains the list of interest groups as provided for in section 31 of
the Constitution of Kenya Review Act, 2008 is another sticking point. Litigation or
contestations around some of these issues could delay the process. These anomalies
should be corrected with speed.
177.

Committee of Experts: On February 10, 2009, Parliament endorsed the names of
nine experts as well as that of a Director nominated by the Parliamentary Select
Committee on Constitutional Review to spearhead the review process. The
Committee is expected to complete its task and deliver a new constitution within a
year. However, it is not clear when the countdown begins - whether from the date of
commencement of the Act or from the date the Committee was constituted.

178.

There is a three-month gap between the two points. It is important for the
government to clarify – by law – the actual time when a new constitution will be in
place. The public is expectant about a new constitution because it would unlock
other reforms and solutions to long-standing issues. Lack of clarity on these dates in
the face of public anxiety only generates unnecessary tension.

179.

It is commendable that the Kenyan experts to the Committee do not represent
ethnic regions. Past representation on the constitution making body took into
account ethno-regional interests and, therefore, fomented political divisions at the
outset. Appointing members on the basis of skills and expertise is a measure against
such interests. However, the delays in equipping the Committee’s offices are
regrettable and affect its work plan. Bureaucratic challenges in procuring resources
must be addressed with speed. Internal cohesion for the Committee is also critical
to enable it to make up for lost time. Political divisions in the review process usually
emerge when experts represent partisan interests. For this reason, the Committee
should account to the public through structured and timely media briefings, citing
both progress made and challenges experienced. This should create demand for
cohesion and action.
Consultations with Stakeholders: The Ministry of Justice, National Cohesion and
Constitutional Affairs has consulted with various stakeholders, including religious
leaders, the media, professional bodies, civil society and trade unions on the review
process. The Committee of Experts has also called for memoranda from groups and
individuals on areas that are contentious in the new constitution.

180.

181.

Some politicians (national political elite) appear to place a low premium on the
constitution review process. Between January and April 2009, few politicians
publicly discussed the importance of speeding up the process, yet they have
extensively discussed new elections and renegotiation of the National Accord. It is
possible that politicians will have little interest in the process at the beginning only
to cause disruptions and unnecessary delays much later. In fact, the survey
conducted in the post-election violence areas shows that disagreements among
politicians are the main threat to the completion of the review process.

182.

These challenges notwithstanding, the public is sceptical about getting a
constitution that reflects their aspirations. In the post-election violence areas, about
51 per cent of the respondents thought the new constitution would be
unsatisfactory. Only 34 per cent of the respondents felt confident that it would
address the needs of Kenyans. Asked what they thought a new constitution should
cover to make it relevant to the needs of Kenyans, respondents identified jobs for
the youth (20 per cent), more rights (19 per cent), and the redistribution of
resources (18 per cent). They also mentioned institutional reforms, including
reducing presidential power (11 per cent), strengthening Parliament (7 per cent),
Majimbo or decentralisation (6 per cent), and the creation of the post of a Prime
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Minister (4 per cent). This suggests that people are conscious of having
constitutional reform that addresses the core of development problems in Kenya
and which is at the core of its political issues. Thus, Kenyans are conscious about
what they want in a new constitution.

Figure 5: Challenge towards making a new constitution

Challenge towards making a new constitution

b) Judiciary
183.

The mediation process envisaged the following reforms in the Judiciary:
(a) Constitutional review to anchor judicial reform measures.
(b) Enactment of a Judicial Service Commission Act.
(c) Streamlining the functioning of legal and judicial institutions by adopting a
sector-wide approach to recruitment, training, planning, management, and
implementation of programmes and activities in the justice sector.
Progress on judicial reforms

184.

Some of the judicial reforms envisaged in the mediation process depend on the
enactment of a new constitution. A new constitution is expected to provide for
greater judicial independence as well as enhance transparency in the management,
appointment and discipline of Judges. Further, it lays the basis for the enactment of
the Judicial Service Act, expected to be in place within three months of a new
constitution coming into force.

185.

Judicial Service Bill: The aim of this Bill is to evolve an independent, efficient and
effective Judiciary. The mediation process envisaged that the Bill would be enacted
following the adoption of a new constitution because some of its provisions require
amendments to or enactment of a new constitution. However, to evolve an efficient
and effective Judiciary does not require a new constitution. The Judiciary must take
proactive lead steps to address the causes of its inefficiency. Nevertheless, there are
other broader factors that administrative approaches alone cannot tackle. For
example, the growing perception of political influence and patronage requires more
elaborate approaches than administrative actions. Judicial reforms, therefore, need
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to be seen in the context of broader social-political reforms, which only a new and
democratic constitution can deliver. Nonetheless, the Judiciary has launched a new
strategic plan to address some of its internal challenges.
186.

Judiciary’s Strategic Plan: The Judiciary finalised and launched its 2009-2012
Strategic Plan on March 20, 2009. The plan identifies the enactment of the Judicial
Service Bill, improving human resource capacity within the Judiciary and
establishing a communication department as important objectives.80 The Judiciary
also organised an Open Day on March 20, 2009 under the theme: “To Provide
Expeditious Administration of Justice”. The Open Day enabled the public to
interact with Judiciary staff. Further, the Judiciary is also starting digital audio
recording of court proceedings and developing a computer-based case tracking and
management system. In addition, the Rules Committee has adopted new Civil
Procedure rules. One of its aims is to simplify court processes and put the
management of cases on the shoulders of the judicial officers rather than the
litigants.

187.

While these administrative and technical steps are important, they are not sufficient
to address the problems in the Judiciary. Issues such as failure to expedite the fight
against corruption, claims of political influence and patronage in the appointment
of Judges and in the constitution of the Judicial Service Commission, as well as the
general lack of independence of the Judiciary from the Executive cannot be
addressed administratively. Only a radical transformation of the relations between
the Judiciary and the Executive can. A new constitution provides an opportunity to
revise this relationship. In spite of these observations, there is no public debate on
what the new constitution should provide with respect to addressing the
weaknesses of the Judiciary.
c) Police reforms

188.

The mediation process outlined these steps to reform the Police:
(a) Constitutional review to establish an independent Police Commission.
(b) A review and definition of the role of the Administration Police.
(c) A review of laws and issues related to security and policing (including setting up
an Independent Complaints Commission, citizen oversight of police services,
enhanced information disclosure, human resource management and capacity
building) to bring the police in line with modern democratic norms.
(d) Finalisation and rollout of the National Security Policy to enable relevant
sectors to develop their specific sectoral policies.
(e) Recruiting and training more police officers to raise the police-to-population
ratio to UN standards.

Progress on police reforms
189.
Independent Police Commission: The completion of the constitution review process
will provide the springboard for far-reaching reforms in the police force, including
the establishment of an independent Police Service Commission. However, some
reforms within the police force cannot await the adoption of a new constitution and
should be undertaken immediately. Focused interventions to change the behaviour

80

Interview with a Senior official, the Judiciary, March 2009.
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of the police in how they handle violence, investigate crimes, and make arrests are
required long before thorough constitutional reforms. Complaints about
recruitment not being merit-based and the general demand to make the police more
professional in their relations with the public should also be addressed.
190.

The Police Oversight Board would have addressed some of these issues; but it is yet
to commence work seven months after its formation in September 2008.81
Furthermore, the Board has been criticised for lacking independence, powers,
funding and staffing. It suffers a credibility crisis. It is commendable, however, that
the police are aware of some of the problems within the force. For instance, the
police force has prioritised training of staff to address some of these issues and has
also taken measures to discipline errant officers.82 Without legislative measures to
facilitate police reforms and without an institutional overhaul, it will be difficult to
achieve administrative reforms.

191.

Role of the Administration Police: Not much progress was recorded in reviewing
and defining the role of the Administration Police. Further, the review of laws and
issues related to security policing has not been undertaken, and the National
Security Policy has also not been finalised.
Overall, progress to radically transform the police force was not visible by end of
April 2009. For any impact to be felt, police reforms should be seen in tandem with
reform of the security sector in general. Thus, there is need to begin fast-tracking
reforms in the sector even as the country awaits a new constitution on which
comprehensive reforms will be anchored. A critical transformation is needed in this
sector even before the country goes to the next General Election, or even to the
referendum.

192.

d) Civil Service
193.

The mediation process outlined these steps as pertinent to reforming the civil
service:
(a) Parliament should pass a Bill incorporating civil service reform measures from
past proposed draft constitutions.
(b) Ongoing administrative and financial reforms should continue.
(c) Results-based management and performance contracting should cover all
persons paid by public funds.
(d) Parliament should review the Anti-corruption and Economic Crimes Act, 2003,
and Public Officer Ethics Act, 2003 on incomes, assets and liabilities. This will
establish an efficient institutional framework that devolves authority to the
lower levels administratively, is compliance-driven and open to analysis.
(e) Constitutional and legal reforms to facilitate parliamentary vetting of
appointments to senior public positions.
(f) New legislation on whistle-blower protection, freedom of information and
operationalisation of the Witness Protection Act, 2006.
(g) Review of recruitment legislation to institutionalise the national character in the
public service.
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Progress on implementation
194.

Various civil service reforms are ongoing. The mediation process envisaged
performance contracting for all persons paid by public funds. In this regard,
Results-based Management and Performance Contracting have been embraced at
various levels of the public service.83 In the period under review, the results of the
performance of ministries and government departments were released amid
controversy over assessment tools.

195.

Other features of civil service reform include the new public service superannuation
contributory pension scheme and the increase in the retirement age of civil servants
from 55 years to 60. Teachers have opposed the pension scheme, saying the
government should outline a distinct retirement plan for them.84 The youth have
also protested against raising the retirement age of civil servants as it locks them
out of employment. However, many civil servants are still productive at the age of
55. The government also trains officers until the age of 47. With the retirement age
at 55, the government tends to lose people before it has effectively utilised them.

196.

Parliamentary Vetting of Senior Public Appointments: The mediation process
envisaged Parliament vetting in appointments to public positions established under
the National Accord. Parliament has nominated and vetted appointments to the
Committee of Experts on the constitution review as well as the members of the
Interim Independent Electoral Commission (IIEC). Although this is a positive
move, it has also unnecessarily politicised commission positions. Political interests
around these positions have the potential to erode public confidence in institutions.

197.

At the same time, vetting has delayed appointments as partisan interests for control
of important institutions, thus creating tension between the Executive and the
Legislature. This tension revolves around whether Parliament should both
nominate and vet appointees or restrict itself to vetting the Executive’s choices.
Constitutional and legal reforms can clearly define and anchor the role of these two
arms of government in the making of public appointments.

e) Parliament
198.

Parliament has continued with its reform process as envisaged under the mediation
agreements. The targets are as follows:
(a) Comprehensively review parliamentary Standing Orders and procedures to
enrich the quality and output of debates and strengthen multiparty democracy.
(b) Strengthen Parliament’s research centre.
(c) Introduce live coverage of parliamentary proceedings and electronic voting;
(d) Enhance Parliament’s oversight role in the national budget;
(e) Review Standing Orders to create a monitoring and implementation committee.
(f) Introduce stricter and timelier deliberations on reports by institutions such as
the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission, the Kenya National Audit Office, the
State Law Office, and the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights.
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(g) Strengthen organs of Parliament, such as the Parliamentary Investment
Committee to promote transparency, accountability in the utilisation of public
resources;
(h) Improve transparency of MPs by creating a register of interests and opening up
parliamentary committee work to the public.
(i) Review parliamentary Standing Orders to ensure that membership of oversight
committees is based on competence and integrity.
Progress towards reforming Parliament
199.

Review of Parliamentary Standing Orders: Parliament has adopted new Standing
Orders aimed at increasing transparency and accountability to the public.
Sensitisation meetings for parliamentary staff, Members of Parliament and civil
servants handling parliamentary questions have been undertaken in readiness for
the Standing Orders coming into force.

200.

Parliament’s Research Centre: The mediation process prioritised strengthening of
the Research Centre to offer services to Parliament and other users. In February
2009, three new researchers were recruited to staff the Research Centre.

201.

Live Coverage and Electronic Voting: Live broadcast of proceedings through the
Kenya Broadcasting Corporation has contributed to enhanced public interest in
parliamentary debates. The public can follow deliberations on the floor of
Parliament. Parliament is also acquiring its own broadcast equipment to ensure
greater access and success of the live broadcasting project.

202.

Parliament’s Oversight Role in the National Budget: The Standing Orders are also
aimed at increasing Parliament’s oversight role. Order 143 expressly provides for
the Minister responsible for Finance to lay before the House a Budget Policy
Statement by March 21 of each year. This provision gives Parliament a longer period
to scrutinise the Budget. This new provision’s impact will only come into effect once
Parliament undertakes its oversight role. This oversight role was to be enhanced
through enactment of the Fiscal Management Bill at the end of 2008. The President
returned the Bill to Parliament, however, with a memorandum outlining his
objections to it. By end of April, Parliament had yet to debate the memorandum but
it has rekindled discussions on the appropriate balance of power between the
Executive and the Legislature.

203.

Improving Transparency of MPs: There is no apparent progress made in opening
up the work of parliamentary committees to the public. MPs have been repeatedly
criticised for not paying tax on their allowances. In response to these criticisms, the
Speaker appointed a taskforce to receive views from the public on remuneration
and taxation of MPs.
Undertaking land reforms

204.

The mediation team prioritised the following steps to address land issues in Kenya:
(a) Constitutional review to address fundamental issues of land tenure and land
use.
(b) Development and implementation of land policies, taking into account the
linkages between land use, environmental conservation, forestry and water
resources.
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(c) Finalisation of the draft National Land Policy and enactment of attendant
legislation.
(d) Establishment of transparent, decentralised, affordable and efficient GIS-based
Land Information Management System and GIS land registry at the Ministry of
Lands, and in local authorities.
(e) Replacement of land ownership documents lost in the post-election violence.
(f) Development of a National Land Use Master Plan, taking into account
environmental considerations.
(g) Establishment of a Land Reform Transformation Unit in the Ministry of Lands
to facilitate the implementation of the land reform programmes as outlined in
the National Land Policy.
(h) Strengthening local level mechanisms
administration and management.

for

sustainable

land

rights

(i) Finalising the Land Dispute Tribunal Act.
Progress towards land reforms
205.

Land remains the single most important cause of friction in Kenya. It is a threat to
security and peaceful co-existence, especially in multi-ethnic areas. Interviews at
the local level reveal that in many areas where residents derive their livelihood from
land, the lack of alternative means of subsistence has raised intense demand for
land. Further, the cultural significance of land in certain regions has in certain cases
overshadowed its use as a factor of economic production. Combined with
population pressure on arable land, these factors have sustained access to land as a
source of tension in these areas.

206.

Draft National Land Policy: There was no significant movement towards the
adoption of the National Land Policy in the period under review. However, adoption
of the National Land Policy is critical for the stability of the country as well as for
enhancing the land rights of many people in different parts of the country.

207.

While no legislative reforms were effected, public pressure has pushed the Ministry
of Lands into repossessing illegally acquired property. Media reports show the
Government had recovered large tracts of land and cancelled allotment letters for
102 plots and 17 title deeds that had been irregularly issued to individuals.85 The
delay in adopting the draft National Land Policy, submitted to the Cabinet in
February 2009, has aroused campaigns by civil society and other professionals to
push for its adoption. There has also been pressure against adopting the policy,
underlined by fears that it could provoke a political conflict.

208.

Addressing the Mau Problem: The continued degradation of Mau Forest, an
important water catchment area, and its negative environmental consequences,
remains an issue of concern. In the period under review, the taskforce appointed by
the Prime Minister to investigate ownership of land within the Mau Forest finalised
its work and presented its report. Some members of the task force, however,
disowned the report. Nonetheless, the government’s inability to act decisively to
address these issues betrays the nexus between land and political patronage.

209.

Despite the widespread acknowledgement of the existence of an unjust land
distribution system in Kenya, only 11 per cent of the respondents interviewed in our
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survey called for the prioritisation of land allocation to the local community. A
further 5 per cent of respondents recommended that communities should own land
in their ancestral lands. This could suggest that healing and reconciliation measures
in the areas that were most affected by the post-election violence are inspiring
community reconciliation.
Table 4: Things that the coalition government must do to address land problems in
your community

Things that the Coalition government must do to address land problems in your
community
Enact laws to assist in settling disputes
Distribute land to the landless
Ensure land grabbers have surrendered illegally owned land

24%
23%
20%

Prioritize land allocation to the local community
Allow for both men and women to inherit land
Allow communities only to own land in their ancestral homes
Issue title deeds

11%
7%
5%
4%

Other
Don’t know

4%
2%

210.

Land Use Policy and Land Reform Transformation Unit: The Ministry of Lands
drafted the National Land Use Policy, which aims to “promote sustainable use of
land in order to ensure maximise economic and socio-political benefits for the
people while minimising environmental and cultural negative effects”86. Further,
subject to the recommendations in the draft National Land Policy, the Land Reform
Transformation Unit continued to put together an implementation framework that
will review legislation to harmonise and/or repeal contradictory laws and bodies
dealing with land issues.

211.

GIS-based Land Information Management System: The government has
undertaken to enhance computerisation of ministry transactions, including the land
surveying system by scanning surveyed land images and file tracking in land
adjudication, hence minimising loss of files.87

212.

These findings show little progress in adopting a National Land Policy. The progress
towards Cabinet adoption of this policy has been slow. Significant in the failure to
adopt the National Land Policy is inability to give political direction to the
resolution of the national land question. Because land and power are
interconnected in countries that depend on agriculture, continued procrastination
on the adoption of the draft National Land Policy will create room for the politicians
and other influential people who own huge tracts of land to design strategies to
undermine the policy. Democratic land reforms are, therefore, difficult without a
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Meeting with a senior officer, Ministry of Lands, March 2009.
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democratic constitution. A new constitution would give impetus to radical land
reforms.
Tackling Poverty and Inequality
213.

The mediation process identified some key steps to address this phenomenon,
which are echoed in Kenya’s Vision 2030 and the first Medium-Term Plan, 20082012. These include:
(a) Ensuring equity and balance are attained in development across all regions,
including job creation, poverty reduction, improved income distribution and
gender equity.
(b) Increasing community empowerment through devolved public funds for both
social and income programmes, and developing local capacity to manage
devolved funds.
(c) Implementing policies and programmes that minimise the differences in
income opportunities and access to social services across Kenya, with special
attention to the most disadvantaged communities in the arid and semi-arid
districts, urban informal settlements and pockets of poverty in high potential
areas.
(d) Improving opportunities for disadvantaged groups and regions to create wealth
through increased infrastructure spending on roads, water, sewerage,
communications and electricity that targets poor communities and regions.
(e) Increasing availability of affordable and accessible credit, savings programmes
and appropriate technologies to create an enabling environment for poor
communities to take part in wealth creation.
(f) Developing an affirmative action policy and enhancing the Women’s Enterprise
Fund.
(g) Improving health infrastructure in under-served areas through construction or
rehabilitation of community health centres.
Status of implementation

214.

Famine and the Rising Cost of Food Prices: The period under review witnessed
continued increase in the cost of commodities on the back of a severe famine. Some
leaders at the same time expressed doubts about the government’s ability to realise
Vision 2030. The government, on March 20, 2009, gazetted the private-publicpartnership rules expected to enhance the involvement of private actors in funding
some of the activities in Vision 2030. Further, strategic plans and performance
contracts in the public service are being reviewed to ensure consistency with the
goals set out in Vision 2030 and the Medium Term Plan 2008-2012.88

215.

Interventions to tackle poverty, inequality and regional imbalances may not show
impact immediately, but it is important that a clear policy framework to guide
development strategies towards the achievement of set goals is in place. One
challenge in tracking this component is the paucity of current data. For example,
the last Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey was in 2007. Thus, to
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216.

determine the actual poverty levels since the signing of the National Accord would
be difficult.
Effects of the Economic Crisis on Implementation of Vision 2030: The effects of the
economic crunch that followed the global financial crisis are gradually showing in
Kenya. The government, through the Ministry of Finance, announced fiscal
austerity measures, including cuts in public spending. Some government
programmes slowed down project implementation. Moreover, the Nairobi Stock
Exchange continued to suffer from a crisis of confidence. These developments pose
a threat to the goals of Vision 2030 and the intermediate development programmes
addressing poverty and inequality.

217.

Pro-poor projects in the Budget have been ring-fenced, meaning that even when the
government reduces its expenditure, these items will not be affected. Commendable
progress has been made in improving the management and operations of the
Constituency Development Fund. Following amendments to the Constituency
Development Act in 2008, a CDF Board was appointed in place of the CDF National
Management Committee. In March 2009, a Chief Executive Officer was hired.
However, only half of the total Constituency Development Fund allocations have
been disbursed this financial year, apparently because the government is strained
financially.89

218.

One area that still poses a challenge is the prudent utilisation of resources at the
community level and the monitoring of progress. In the last quarter of 2008, a
group of civil society organisations under the umbrella of the National Taxpayers
Association released a report detailing mismanagement of some devolved funds.
The report raised controversy, with several Members of Parliament accusing the
authors of sensationalism and not conducting a scientific study. However, the
report’s release highlighted the need to ensure a systematic and periodic audit of
the use and management of decentralised funds.

219.

Creation of New Districts: New administrative districts were created during the
period under review; about 55 of them were scheduled for gazetting during the
month of May. Interviews in some areas show that the new districts have provided
employment opportunities to the youth, among other things.90 The creation of new
districts brought to the fore debate on community empowerment vis-à-vis politics.
Concerns, for example, were raised regarding the speed with which the districts
were created while a law has been passed to draw boundaries and review them.
There is need for clear objectives that guide the creation of districts because of the
important role that any decentralisation unit plays in national development. There
is need to create districts based on well defined criteria and, in particular, those that
seek to establish them as units for promoting participatory development and
enhancing community empowerment and political accountability.

Tackling Unemployment, Particularly among the Youth
220.

The youth, and mainly those unemployed, played a key role in perpetrating violence
in the aftermath of the 2007 election dispute. In recognition of this, the mediation
process recommended the following reforms to enhance employment among the
youth.

89 Interview with Economic Secretary, Ministry of Planning, National Development and Vision 2030, held
on April 19, 2009.
90 Investigations at the District Steering Groups.
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(a) Generating an average of 740,000 new jobs each year from 2008 to 2012.
(b) Revitalising and expanding youth polytechnics in all districts to facilitate
training of young people in technical, vocational and entrepreneurial skills to
enable them to participate fully in productive activities.
(c) Rehabilitating youth empowerment centres and establish three new ones.
(d) Developing and enacting the National Youth Council Bill.
(e) Establishing youth enterprise and employment programmes to promote small
and medium-scale enterprises as well as self-employment among the youth.
(f) Increasing youth enterprises and development funds and putting in place
mechanisms for easier access to credit and collateral.
Progress on implementation
221.

Job Creation: For the Coalition Government to satisfy the youth in the country, it
must create many jobs rapidly. Respondents in a survey in the post-election
violence areas pointed out that the youth mostly complain about lack of
employment opportunities. Unemployment yields poverty and leaves youth open to
the temptation to engage in activities detrimental to their wellbeing such as drug
abuse and crime. Unemployment makes the youth a target for misuse by

political leaders.
Figure 6: What are the main issues that the youth in this area complain about?
(aggregate responses)
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50%

48%
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222.

19%
9%

6%

6%

4%

3%

2%

2%

1%

Based on these findings, it is clear that unemployment among the youth is an urgent
challenge. The government has undertaken various reforms in an effort to enhance
employment among the youth. These include acquisition of a Ksh2.9 billion loan
from the African Development Bank (ADB) to finance a Technical, Industrial,
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Vocational and Entrepreneurship Training (TIVET) project in response to the
problem of huge numbers of unskilled and unemployed youth.
223.

Youth Enterprise and Employment Programme: The government has instituted
programmes to tackle poverty among the youth. One such programme is the “Kazi
kwa Vijana”. The President and the Prime Minister launched the Ksh15 billion
short-term programme on March 12, 2009 in Kajiado District in an effort to address
hunger, taking note of the current famine in the country, while tackling
unemployment.91 It will enable the youth to work on key infrastructure projects,
creating 300,000 jobs. One of the criticisms of the programme, though, is that it
focuses on youth with low-level skills. There is need to address the plight of the
unemployed youth who are highly skilled.

224.

The government has also put in place a long-term plan to promote employment
among the youth through various programmes. While these measures are
important, the huge number of dependent young people in the demographic profile
is a cause for concern. Without adequate job opportunities to engage the youth
effectively, the lure of recruitment into illegal groups or other illegal activity that
provides an income is hard to resist.
Consolidating National Cohesion and Unity

225.

The post-election violence resulted in deep divisions along ethnic lines. In order to
attain a cohesive and peaceful society, the mediation process put forth the following
action points pertinent to consolidating national cohesion and unity.
(a) Finalising and supporting the enactment of the National Cohesion and
Integration law.
(b) Parliament and the Executive initiating and sustaining advocacy on ethnic and
racial harmony.
(c) Establishing and operationalising a policy and institutional framework for
peace-building and conflict resolution, and early warning mechanisms on social
conflict, as well as enactment of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Bill.
(d) Extending the District Peace Committee framework to the entire country and
linking it to District Security Committees.
(e) Finalising the Hate Speech Bill and reviewing the Media Act to deal with
incitement.
(f) Undertaking civic education on ethnic relations.
(g) Inculcating a civic culture that tolerates diversity and encourages inter-ethnic
cooperation, through the school curriculum.
(h) Operationalisation of the TJRC
Progress towards implementation

226.

The government has undertaken legislative measures to enhance national cohesion
and integration. However, save for passage of the National Cohesion and
Integration Act, both the Legislature and the Executive have not taken on a
meaningful role in enhancing ethnic harmony. Instead, political conflicts over the
past few months seem to have taken ethnic overtones reminiscent of the 2007
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elections campaigns.92 In order to enhance national cohesion, it is imperative that
the citizenry articulates national ethos that will result in public sensitivity to
negative or criminal activities.93
227.

National Cohesion and Integration Act, 2008: In a gazette notice dated March 2,
2009, the Minister for Justice, National Cohesion and Constitutional Affairs
operationalised the National Cohesion and Integration Act, 2008 and gave the
commencement date as March 9, 2009. The Act outlaws discrimination on ethnic
grounds and provides for the establishment of a National Cohesion and Integration
Commission.”

228.

Hate Speech Bill and Media Act: The National Cohesion and Integration Act 2008
makes it an offence under section 1 for any person to use threatening, abusive or
insulting words in a bid to promote ethnic hatred. Secondly, the amendments to the
Kenya Communications (Amendment) Act in December 2008 included provisions
to curb hate speech.

229.

Agenda Item 4 identified operationalisation of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation
Commission (TJRC) as one of the main actions to be undertaken by the
government. TJRC was expected to complete its work by 2010. The section below
discusses progress in establishing the TJRC.
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission

230.

The TJRC Bill was adopted and passed by Parliament on October 23, 2008 and
became law following presidential assent on November 28, 2008. It came into
operation on March 9, 2009. The Act established a Truth, Justice and
Reconciliation Commission to promote peace, justice, national unity, healing and
reconciliation among the people of Kenya. It is mandated to establish a record,
among others, of all past historical human rights abuses, their cause, nature and
extent as well as recommend prosecution for perpetrators of gross human rights
violations. It is the mandate to facilitate the granting of amnesty to those who make
full disclosure about their activities from 1963 to 2008. It will work for a period of
two years.

231.

In accordance with the Act, a selection panel to spearhead the nomination of six
Kenyan Commissioners and also to consider the applications for removal of
chairperson and Commissioners was inaugurated by the Minister for Justice,
National Cohesion and Constitutional Affairs on 12 March 2009. On 20 March
2009, the selection team called for applications for posts of Commissioners. The
team shortlisted 15 names from which Parliament will identify only six
Commissioners. On 21 April, in accordance with the Act, the Panel of Eminent
African Personalities nominated three non-Kenyan Commissioners for the TJRC.
The President is to formally appoint all nine Commissioners.

232.

The TJRC process has already suffered several challenges. Civil society raised
important concerns on the TJRC Act, arguing that it is flawed in regard to amnesty,
victim’s rights, reparations, gender parity and its constitutionality.94 At the same
time, the TJRC may be faced with lack of witnesses for sensitive cases “due to the

Interview with a Senior Officer, Ministry of Justice, National Cohesion and Constitutional Affairs, on 24
March 2009.
93 Interview, senior researcher, Nairobi Peace Initiative (NPI), March 2009.
94 See paper titled ‘Analysis and Concerns on the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission Bill, 2008
Adopted by the National Assembly on 23 October 2008 and Assented into Law by President Yesterday’ by
the Multi-sectoral Task Force on the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission
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context of fear currently prevailing in the country resulting from the seeming
systematised killings of human rights activists.”95 Provisions for witness protection
need to be strengthened to enable every witness to take a stand. Studies of truth
commissions note that in many cases, truth and justice are pre-conditions to
dialogue and reconciliation. Hence, the commissions may end up having a difficult
task since the needs of victims may be incompatible with the needs of society.
Furthermore, some people may prefer revenge as a form of justice.”96Also TJRC is
important for record purposes and for addressing long standing grievances.
233.

In Kenya’s politically fragmented society, nominees to the TJRC should be people
with a clear track record in advocating reform. The process of appointing
commissioners should be insulated from patronage politics to prevent a situation
where political parties will seek to have their own people in the Commission as a
political pay-off. This will secure credibility for the process. Further, the TJRC will
have to be autonomous and independent of the Executive once it begins its
operations.

234.

Civil society needs to continue agitating for an open and transparent process of
setting up the TJRC. In addition, there may be need to inspire public confidence in
the TJRC for it to be legitimate. TJRC is a complex process for any nation,
therefore, the public must be inspired to hope for an effective process; they need not
lose hope. Currently, as a key informant noted, Kenya does not have a leader with a
uniting moral voice to do this like Nelson Mandela in South Africa.97
Addressing Transparency, Accountability and Impunity

235.

The mediation process envisaged various action points to advance increased
transparency and accountability, including:
(a) Strengthening the policy, legal and institutional framework for increased public
transparency and accountability, anti-corruption, ethics and integrity.
(b) Undertaking programmes to support improved prosecution and adjudication of
corruption and economic crimes.
(c) Enhancing capacity and performance in investigations and asset tracing.
(d) Continuous monitoring of the Public Officer Ethics Act.
(e) Revitalising public financial management, including that of devolved funds.
(f) Expanding the capacity of District Anti-Corruption Civilian Oversight
Committees to monitor management of devolved funds and stigmatise
corruption.
(g) Reviewing the effectiveness of the Public Procurement Oversight Authority.
(h) Undertaking structural reforms that focus on prevention, investigation,
recovery of corruptly acquired assets.
(i) Reviewing the effectiveness of the Privatisation Commission.
(j) Fully operationalising and building the capacity of the Public Complaints
Standing Committee.

Remarks a Commissioner, KNCHR, during a meeting to discuss the TJRC Act, March 2009
Interview with retired cleric and former vice chair of a taskforce examining the viability of forming a
TJRC
97 Interview with a senior researcher, Nairobi Peace Initiative
95

96
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(k) Finalising and operationalising the Governance, Justice, Law and Order Sector
(GJLOS) policy framework and establishing a comprehensive GJLOS policy.
(l) Sustaining the African Peer Review Mechanism process by ensuring assessment
of the government.
Progress towards implementation
236.

In the period under review, there was evidence of the resurgence of high-level
corruption, coupled with the failure to fight graft despite the existence of various
anti-corruption institutions. The challenge in fighting corruption was occasioned by
the absence of adequate legislative measures and the existence of a weak
investigation and prosecution system that further restrained the implementation of
reforms to curb the vice. A further challenge was the tendency, especially by
Members of Parliament, to mobilise ethnicity as a tool in their defence against
corruption investigations or queries.

237.

The Coalition Government continued to be riddled with corruption scandals during
the period under review. The allegations resulted, in certain instances, in the
suspension and/or dismissal of government officials to pave way for investigations.
Some of the highlight incidents included the following:
a) Oil scandal: The Kenya Pipeline Company and Triton Petroleum Company
Limited were at the centre of a scandal in which financiers risked losing up to
Ksh7.6 billion.
b) Tourism: The Managing Director of the Kenya Tourism Board resigned in the
wake of allegations of irregularly allocating Ksh43 million to private companies.
c) Maize scandal: The Minister for Agriculture, William Ruto, was at the centre of
allegations that maize had been allocated to briefcase millers and companies,
resulting in the loss of over Ksh800 million.98
d) Anglo-Leasing: The Kenyan government was faulted by the UK government for
its failure to cooperate with the British Serious Fraud Office (SFO) in the
investigations over the US$100 million (Ksh8 billion) Anglo-Leasing scandal on
security contracts who were paid but did not supply anything. Further, media
reports also noted that promissory notes released to pay for the Anglo-Leasingrelated supplies would not be honoured, further to a public warning issued by
the former Finance Minister. The promissory notes are reportedly still in
force.99
e) Goldenberg: A former Governor of Central Bank of Kenya was the third suspect
to be acquitted from the Ksh5.8 billion Goldenberg case after a Cabinet minister
and a former head of national intelligence.100

238.

Several factors have frustrated efforts to tackle corruption, including conducting
investigations while those implicated are still in office. Kenyans have expressed
pessimism over the government’s ability to tackle corruption due to the difficulty
inherent in establishing how widespread the problem is due to lack of data.101 Up to
46 per cent of the respondents in our survey noted that to fight corruption in Kenya,
those responsible for corrupt actions should be sacked and prosecuted. They said

Daily Nation, January 15, 2009, ‘Land of Scandals’.
Daily Nation, February 27, 2009, “Promissory Notes ‘Will not Be Honoured.’
100 Daily Nation, February 27, 2009, “Wako Pledges to Press on with Goldenberg”.
101 The Standard, February 1, 2009, “Containing Graft Begins with Attitude Change”.
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that such an act would set a precedent for others seeking to engage in acts of
corruption.
Table 5: most important way to fight corruption in Kenya
Sack and prosecute those responsible
Educate the public on not paying bribes
Make laws that can successfully fight corruption
Address unemployment and poverty
Create an independent and effective anticorruption body
RTA
Other

46%
15%
12%
7%
4%
4%
12%

239.

Finalising and Operationalising the Governance, Justice, Law and Order Sector
(GJLOS) Policy Framework: The GJLOS Policy Framework has been developed
and the first draft approved by the Technical Coordinating Committee. It has,
however, not been formally adopted by Cabinet. The framework envisages, among
other things, policy dialogues. While these have not started, they could provide
useful avenues for developing consensus on requisite reforms and ensuring wide
coordination within the sector.

240.

The New Partnership for African Development’s Secretariat in Kenya continues to
assess government performance through the African Peer Review Mechanism and
produces annual reports on performance of government ministries, together with
progress reports every six months.

CONCLUSIONS
241.

The constitutional reform process is central to addressing the long-term issues in
Agenda 4 of the mediation process. A review of the matrix of implementation
reveals that finalisation of the constitutional review process underpins progress in
the majority of the areas in Agenda 4, including those where constitutional reform
is not directly mentioned, such as consolidating national cohesion and unity,
poverty, inequality and regional imbalances and unemployment, especially youth
unemployment. The key role that a new constitution will play in the sustainable
resolution of these areas is all too self-evident.

242.

In the period under review, the principals did not appear to have full control and
overall ownership of implementing reforms. This lack of direction exacerbated by
accusations of corruption in the Grand Coalition, have undermined public
confidence in the leadership’s resolve to push through the envisaged reforms,
especially those contained in Agenda Item 4.

243.

There is reform inertia and public disillusionment with the entire institutional
structure in the country. From the Executive and the Judiciary to the Legislature,
citizens’ confidence in institutions is at an all-time low. Institutions are not seen as
being competent dispensers of their mandate, but avenues for personal
aggrandisement, active participants in creating moral decay and practising ills such
57

as favouritism and ineptitude. It is critical that the reform process gets a fresh
impetus to restore public confidence and entice their participation in the reform
process.
244.

While pursuing truth, justice and reconciliation, it is important to pay attention to
how this is done so that the process is sensitive to ethnic politics and divisions. Any
perceptions that a process or procedure appears to be in favour of a particular
community will compromise the process and prevent it from achieving its goals.
Further, credibility and integrity of people appointed to the Commission is critical if
TJRC is to create conditions for healing, reconciliation and national cohesion.
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6.

IMPLEMENTING RECOMMENDATIONS BY COMMISSIONS OF
INQUIRY

Background
245.

The Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation Committee, together with the
Panel of Eminent African Personalities, agreed to establish several Commissions of
Inquiry including the Independent Review Committee on the 2007 General
Elections (IREC) and the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence
(CIPEV). IREC and CIPEV completed their tasks and submitted reports containing
several recommendations by the last quarter of 2008.

246.

This section of the report discusses the status of implementation of these
Commissions of Inquiry and the challenges, if any, experienced in implementing
recommendations. We note that Parliament was recalled on January 20, 2009
under special circumstances to deal with the establishment of a Special Tribunal to
try suspects of the post-election violence and select members to the IIEC. It was also
expected to select nominees to the Interim Independent Boundaries Review
Commission (IIRBC) and the Independent Interim Constitutional Dispute
Resolution Court (IICDRC).
Status of Implementation
The Independent Review Commission on the General Elections held in
Kenya on December 27, 2007

247.

Realising that the manner in which the December 2007 elections were held partly
led to the January 2008 violence, the AU Panel of Eminent African Personalities
proposed the formation of an Independent Review Commission on the General
Elections held in Kenya on 27 December 2007 (IREC). The Commission was
mandated to examine the 2007 elections from various perspectives. It completed its
work and submitted a report of its findings to the Coalition Government and the
Panel in September 2008.

248.

IREC’s conclusion was that Kenya’s constitutional and legal framework relating to
elections contained a number of weaknesses and inconsistencies that undermined
its effectiveness. The Commission called for urgent and radical revision, including
consolidation of Kenya’s electoral laws. In addition, the commission recommended
an overhaul of the electoral management body, including disbandment of the
Electoral Commission of Kenya and creation of a new body to manage elections and
a boundaries commission.

249.

A number of steps have been taken to implement IREC’s recommendations. They
include:
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•

the passage of the Constitutional of Kenya (Amendment) Bill, 2008 in
December 2008, which effectively disbanded the ECK and set the pace for
the establishment of an Interim Independent Electoral Commission (IIEC)
that would be in charge of supervising the elections for 24 months or until a
new commission is entrenched in a new constitution. The law also proposes
the creation of an Interim Independent Boundaries Review Commission,
responsible for demarcating new constituencies and civic wards.

•

Disbanding of ECK: In January 2009, an inter-ministerial taskforce on the
dissolution of the Electoral Commission of Kenya was constituted to
determine how ECK would be disbanded and identify what measures would

be taken in the interim102. The Task Force presented a report to both the
President and Prime Minister in January 2009. Arising from this report,
some 466 former employees of ECK were redeployed to the civil service in
various capacities, according to their qualifications and skills.103 None of the
former ECK commissioners were given another posting “but their terminal
benefits will be duly settled.”104
•

Selection of the IIEC Commissioners: In January 2009, the Parliamentary
Select Committee on the Constitution advertised posts for commissioners to
the IIEC, the Interim Independent Boundaries Review Commission and
Judges of the Independent Interim Constitutional Dispute Resolution Court
(IICDRC). However, Parliament did not ratify the names of the nominated
Commissioners to the IIEC. Some members raised issues of integrity and
conflict of interest on some of the names. For this reason, some posts were
re-advertised.105 The Parliamentary Committee then conducted fresh
interviews and identified several commissioners. In April, Parliament
ratified these names, which were to later receive presidential approval.

250.

These are important achievements. However, the process leading to these
achievements had several weaknesses, which constitute a problematic start in the
establishment of the IIEC. First, there were disagreements along political party
lines while discussing nominees for the post of chair.106 Some of the arguments in
this disagreement had ethnic overtones, implying that the process was gradually
getting ethnicised and politicised. In this context, one MP noted, “different political
contestations in Parliament took precedence over the formation of the IIEC.”107 An
important observation is that some MPs rejected some of the nominees because
they were concerned about integrity and conflict of interest.

251.

The second problem concerned integrity and transparency in the recruitment
process. Media reports alluded to instances where some of the candidates not
shortlisted for the various positions were interviewed and nominated for
consideration by Parliament. Applicants also cited cases where interviews took very
few minutes against what one would expect in searches for executive positions.108
Significantly, background checks had not been done on some of the candidates, yet
they were interviewed and names passed for parliamentary approval.109 Related to
this were also media reports that some members of the parliamentary committee
were opposed to some applicants being interviewed because the latter had a bad
relationship with some ministries.110

252.

Thirdly, nomination to the IIEC assumed an ‘ethno-regional’ character. Members
were appointed as representatives of the regions where they come from. And since

102 Office of the President, Permanent Secretary, Secretary to the Cabinet and Head of the Public Service,
Advertiser, January 21, 2009
103 Interview with Permanent Secretary Ministry of Public Service, March 2009
104 ibid
105 Even if not all the names proposed were contested, the list is supposed to be confirmed as whole. Hence
the rejection of one name results in the whole list being null and void.
106 “Deadlock over Miller,” Kenya Times Online,
http://www.kenyatimesonline.com/content.asp?catid=2&articleId=2552
107 Remarks by Cabinet minister Martha Karua during a public forum on power sharing in ethnically
divided societies, February 2009
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‘New electoral team faulted’. The Daily Nation, 9 February 2009
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“Sorry for Former ECK Nominee, Says House Team,” The Standard, February 23, 2009, pg 4
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‘Revealed: Intrigues that led to Miller’s appointment’. The East African Standard, 18 February 2009
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regions in the country have ethnic characteristics, one may argue that the process to
‘tribalise’ the new electoral body has begun in earnest. The Independent Review
Commission had already identified representation of regions by commissioners as
having contributed to reduced integrity of the former ECK. Indeed, some people in
government had also proposed a smaller number of commissioners – not exceeding
five – to prevent politicians from using ethnic considerations in making
appointments to these new bodies.
253.

These three challenges imply that the establishment of a new elections body started
on a wrong footing. This is problematic for a body that is seeking to re-establish and
re-build people’s faith and confidence in electoral procedures and processes. These
weaknesses should have been avoided to allow people to re-build their confidence in
elections and electoral processes. As pointed out by one respondent, ‘the credibility
and integrity of the body has already been questioned and may be seen as another
avenue for politicians to put their people in readiness for 2012.”111 Only the integrity
and professional conduct of its new officials will vindicate the Commission and
restore people’s confidence in a new electoral body.

254.

If Parliament establishes a new but questionable IIEC which does not have the trust
and support of Kenyans, electoral violence is likely to recur. As the survey in areas
that experienced post-election violence attests to, 42 per cent of respondents believe
a new electoral body will be capable of holding free and fair elections. However, 36
per cent do not think it will.
Figure 7: In your opinion, will a new electoral body be capable of holding free and fair
elections?

No
36%
Yes
42%

Don't Know
20%

Refused to
answer
2%

111

Interview with, Civil Society key informant, March 2009

61

255.

Cultivating political cohesion is important for the Coalition Government to pass its
reform laws. The principals thus need to lead the reform agenda back on track.
Further, insulation of the IIEC from politics by the principals to act for the good of
the Kenyan people is key in ensuring the successful implementation of commissions
of inquiry recommendations.
Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence

256.

The parties to the mediation expressed a commitment to investigate circumstances
related to acts of violence that followed the 2007 election and recommend measures
to bring to justice those responsible for criminal acts. Thus, the parties agreed to
form a Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence. The Commission was
constituted on May 23, 2008 and tasked to: 112
(a) investigate the facts and surrounding circumstances related to acts of violence
that followed the 2007 general elections;
(b) investigate the actions or omissions of State Security agencies during the course
of violence;
(c) recommend measures of a legal, political or administrative nature, as
appropriate including measures with regard to bringing to justice those persons
responsible for criminal acts. The Commission was to prevent repeat of similar
deeds and in general eradicate impunity and promote national reconciliation.

257.

The Commission (popularly referred to as the ‘Waki Commission’ after the Chair,
Justice Waki) submitted its report to the Government and the Panel of Eminent
African Personalities in October 2008. It made far-reaching recommendations
aimed at addressing the causes and impact of the post-election violence. It
recommended institutional and legal reforms as well as the establishment of a
Special Tribunal to deal with perpetrators of the post-election violence.

258.

The government has taken a number of steps in implementing CIPEV
recommendations. These include:

259.

•

In November 2008, the Cabinet adopted the CIPEV report and an eightperson Cabinet Committee headed by the President and the Prime Minister
laid out the report’s implementation framework.

•

On December 16, 2008, the two principals signed an agreement to establish
a Special Tribunal to try prime suspects of the post-election violence.

•

On January 20, 2009, the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation
Committee finalised a draft statute establishing a Special Tribunal to try
suspected perpetrators of the post-election violence and related violations.113

•

On January 28, 2009, Parliament adopted the CIPEV report paving the way
for the introduction of the Statute for the Special Tribunal for debate.

•

In February 2009, Parliament debated and voted against the Constitutional
Amendment Bill that would have paved way for the establishment of a
Special Tribunal.

Besides these steps, in October 2008 the police set up a taskforce to investigate
cases of sexual crimes against women during the post-election violence. The

See ‘Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation Statement on Commission of Inquiry into PostElection Violence,’ www.dialoguekenya.org
113 “Team Finalises Draft Statute on Tribunal,” The Standard January 20, 2009 pg 25
112
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taskforce completed its work and compiled an internal report. The findings were
meant to help the police to prosecute suspects.114
260.

Again it is commendable that there has been action and movement with regard to
establishment of a Special Tribunal to try those involved in the post-election
violence. However, as noted in the discussion on Agenda Item 1 above, prosecution
of suspects who may have committed crimes during the period has been slow and
highly politicised. Although the police made some arrests early in 2008, there is
little to show in terms of actual prosecution. Further delays will have the effect of
reducing people’s confidence in the process, particularly if the victims continue to
see inaction on the part of the government. Significant, of course, is that the
suspects will develop a sense of impunity and feeling of victory against the state for
their violent behaviour. Without speedy prosecution and with firm evidence against
the offenders, justice will be defeated.

261.

As already stated in the discussion of Agenda Item 3, establishment of a Special
Tribunal became increasingly politicised, with politicians considering the merits
and demerits of establishing a local Tribunal or giving room for the suspects to be
taken to the International Criminal Court at The Hague. The process is increasingly
politicised because some politicians suspect their names or names of their rivals are
contained in the list that the Commission handed to the Panel of Eminent African
Personalities awaiting the decision to establish a Tribunal or forward the sealed
envelope to the ICC.

262.

Generally, there are many personal, political and even ethnic considerations
surrounding the debate on the Special Tribunal. Politicians from both sides of the
divide are ‘for’ or ‘against’ the Special Tribunal on the basis of these considerations.
They are mobilising for or against the Tribunal depending on how they think the
Tribunal will impact on their personal interests and political ambitions.

263.

This politicisation of the process to establish a Special Tribunal may lead to people
losing confidence in the Tribunal. For the Tribunal to work, therefore, it will require
that it is independent and that this independence is guaranteed through a legal
framework. Credibility, objectivity and impartiality should be the main principles
and values guiding its operations.

264.

Notwithstanding the above, some people are not in favour of establishing a local
Special Tribunal. From the survey in post-election areas, about half of the
respondents feel that the ICC (The Hague) is the best place to try post-election
violence suspects. Only 33 per cent favour a local Tribunal. Most of the respondents
believe the local Tribunal would be corrupted (15 per cent) while 12 per cent think
they will find fair judgment in The Hague. These fears are due to the recognition of
weaknesses in the national legal and judicial system.115 The fears are also because
successive Kenyan governments have lacked political will to prosecute influential
persons for serious offences, including political violence.

Figure 8 : Should those individuals responsible for the post‐election violence be tried
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Interview with a senior police officer, March 25, 2009
Government of Kenya, Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence report, 2008, pg 463
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265.

Other findings show that the politicians tend to interpret the report in a manner
that suits their own interests. This has affected the way the communities they come
from see implementation of the report.116 In some parts of the Rift Valley, during
the debate on the Special Tribunal, leaflets did circulate warning that there would
be violence if the court was established.117 The leaflets are said to have been written
by an illegal group, Balarget Land Defence Force/Kalenjin Land Defenders.118

266.

Findings of the survey done in the post-election areas reveal that 33 per cent of the
respondents will support the prosecution of a senior member of their community
for post-election violence while 26 per cent would demonstrate against it. A further
18 per cent would participate in violence against other communities and 14 per cent
would threaten them. Thus, prosecutions may be seen as revenge against one
community causing the other to retaliate. The finding that a high number of people
(33 per cent) would support prosecution is an important one. Perhaps it is dawning
on people that political elites are much more concerned with their individual
interests than justice for all.

Interview with provincial administrator based in Eldoret, January 2009
Remarks by Uasin Gishu residents in an interview carried out in December 2008
118 Findings of field research undertaken in Molo and Kuresoi, January 2009
116
117
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Figure 9: If a senior politician from your community is put on trial for inciting post‐
election violence, how do you think people in your community will react?
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267.

Prosecution Versus Other Proposals: Overemphasis on prosecution of perpetrators
of the violence at the expense of other equally important recommendations is an
issue of concern. Politicians appear reluctant to process some of the proposed
reforms.”119 Among these is the merging of the Administration Police and Kenya
Police into a single entity. According to a key informant, politicians refused to take
up this agenda since the Administration Police is a symbol of power and penetrate
deep into the local level.120

268.

Witness Protection: The Witness Protection Act, 2006, has been faulted for failing
to adequately guarantee protection to witnesses of post-election violence.121 It is
likely that a number of key witnesses may stay away from giving crucial evidence
due to threats on their lives. About 60 key witnesses who gave evidence at the
Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence have sought refuge outside
the country or in other parts away from their homes because of threats on their
lives. Some of the reintegrated IDPs in the Rift Valley have negotiated to return to
their farms with the promise that they will not give evidence about the post-election
violence.122 Witness protection, therefore, is an issue that has not been given
priority attention, yet witnesses will be critical in providing evidence. With
politicisation of the Special Tribunal and increased threats on witnesses, the process
to try post-election perpetrators is already in the balance.

269.

Though some progress has been made in implementing the Commission’s
recommendations, there is a need to insulate the proposed reforms from divisive

Interview with civil society key informant, January 2009
Interview with senior police officer March 2009
121 Interview with a civil society key informant, February 2009
122 Interview with a senior police officer, March 25 2009
119

120
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politics that are now a characteristic of the coalition. Both parties should candidly
discuss how to do so and preferably get input from representatives of civil society.
270.

In addition, the Coalition Government needs to expeditiously strengthen the
Witness Protection Act, which will offer genuine protection to the witnesses.
Alternatively, the international community can step in and secure them – if the ICC
is an option. They will then give evidence away from home.
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

271.

Progress has been made in implementing some recommendations of CIPEV and
IREC. However, their full implementation is threatened by political divisions and
politicisation through ethnic mobilisation of constituencies for or against some
aspects of the reform agenda. It is paramount that mechanisms are put in place to
manage the divisions and cultivate a consensus and build political will. Political
leadership, especially by the two principals, is particularly important for this to be
realised.

272.

Failure by Parliament to pass the Statute to establish a Special Tribunal to try
perpetrators of the post-election violence has however provided a negative
precursor to the operationalisation of the TJRC Act. This is because the failure
seems to give support to the culture of impunity even though the government says it
is still committed to establishing a Tribunal.
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OVERALL CONCLUSION

273.

The discussion has highlighted several conclusions in the different sections. This
section recapitulates some of the key issues highlighted so far. It discusses specific
conclusions with regard to progress on each agenda item.

274.

At the outset, it is important to emphasize some of the main achievements of the
coalition government so far. First, political violence has generally stopped and there
is calm in most areas that experienced post-election violence. Illegal armed groups
are also not politically active, although failure to disband these groups remains an
issue of concern. IDP camps have closed down and the resettlement programme has
facilitated many to move out of camps. Humanitarian Fund has facilitated IDPs to
begin their lives afresh. Healing and reconciliation has had a slow start but on the
whole national and local politicians are increasingly involved in reconciling
communities.

275.

Recommendations by the various Commissions of Inquiry are also being
implemented. The constitutional review process has begun and a new Electoral
Commission is in place. The Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission is also
being established.

276.

These are not simple achievements for a country that was heading towards civil war.
But this does not by any means suggest that the country has addressed the
fundamental factors that contributed to the crisis. Far from it. The progress towards
implementing crucial reforms under each of the agenda items has been slow. The
approach to some of the issues is also undermining the quest for healing and
reconciliation. Furthermore, divisions in the coalition are entrenching the
perception of a ‘two-governments-in-one’ and fomenting public disillusionment and
dissatisfaction on this government’s commitment to deliver on its goal:
achievement of sustainable peace, stability and justice in Kenya.

277.

Lack of cohesion in the Coalition Government and the political conflicts animating
it are a considerable threat to reforms in the country. They have the potential to
push the country back to another crisis and/or exacerbate animosity between
communities. This suggests that nothing short of far-reaching social- economic and
political reforms – including constitutional and institutional reforms – will end the
cycle of violence the country continues to witness.

278.

There is need for caution here, however. Not just any kind of reform will satisfy the
majority of Kenyans. Reforms that tend to appease the political leaders will not
address the root causes of the country’s problems. The survey findings show that
ordinary citizens prefer not only institutional reforms but also those that will
improve their well-being. For this reason, it is important that reforms focus on a
constitution that is desirable to the majority of the people.

279.

The discussion on Agenda Item I on Actions to Stop Violence shows that the
problem of militias appears to be growing. The illegal armed groups are growing in
number owing to internal factionalism and general mutation. Some groups formed
as ‘political militia’ have accumulated money through criminal activities such as
extortion, and have increasingly become independent of politicians. Overall, there
are groups around the country that could easily mobilise for political violence.
Because of their criminal nature, there is a dilemma on how to deal with them.
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280.

Findings on Agenda Item 2 on Addressing the Humanitarian Crisis and Promoting
Healing and Reconciliation show that the situation of Internally Displaced Persons
(IDPs) has not improved. Some continue to live in deplorable ‘transit’ camps where
they moved after the government forcibly evicted them from the various camps
where they settled during and after the violence. IDPs are yet to get sustainable
peace and secure means of livelihood. The handling of the IDP problem poses a
threat to healing and reconciliation. This raises a need to develop a comprehensive
policy on resettlement of IDPs. Such a policy should evolve in consultation with the
IDPs and the local communities.

281.

Agenda Item 3: Resolving the Political Crisis. Findings show that the Coalition
Government is still conducting its affairs without unity of purpose. The image
projected and activities support the perception of a ‘two-governments-in-one’.
There is no cohesion in decision-making and ministers continue to voice divided
opinions on crucial issues. These divisions between the coalition parties and within
each of the parties are a threat to the reform agenda. They consume time and energy
that would better be expended on reforms. Simply put, lack of cohesion is the single
most important threat to reforms and to Kenya’s future political stability.
Disagreement over distribution of power and patronage is likely to spill over into
the constitutional review process and frustrate delivery of a new constitution.

282.

Agenda Item 4: Tackling Long-Standing Issues. The process to jump-start the
constitutional review has begun rather slowly. The Committee of Experts has had a
slow start, a factor that will certainly affect the work plan and possibly delay
completion of the review process. The slow pace of activities is witnessed in other
reform imperatives, including land reform. Although Agenda 4 is critical to the
future of the country, the slow pace of reforms is worrisome. Mobilising various
constituencies to speed up reforms in all respects is critical. Conflicts within the
Grand Coalition will, however, undermine not only the speed but also the nature of
reforms to be realised.

283.

Implementing Recommendations by Commissions of Inquiry. Although there is
visible movement in implementing some of the recommendations by Commissions
of Inquiry, there is also a marked tendency to renege on some of the principles that
shaped those recommendations. In this regard, the process of recruiting members
of IIEC was highly politicised, with members selected on ethno-regional
considerations. Also, the attempt to establish a Special Tribunal to try the
perpetrators of post-election violence witnessed highly politicised debate, much of
which had ethnic overtones.

284.

It appears that various political leaders have forgotten the principles that shaped
these recommendations -- the desire to fight impunity and de-ethnicise the political
landscape. Objective delivery on these commissions’ recommendations is vital if
similar ones are to enjoy public support in future.

285.

The final observation is that the momentum for radical reforms has reduced. The
speed towards another General Election is increasing; yet attempts to address some
of the proximate and structural factors that led to unprecedented political violence
are not evident. Political cohesion in the Coalition Government and reforms in
general are very critical for the stability and prosperity of the country. Without
undertaking fundamental reforms, another violent civil conflict could recur. In
order to prevent the recurrence of violence, it is critical to fast-track the
constitutional review process and provide a democratic constitution rather than
what the political elites desire – a Constitution that satisfies their quest for power
and satisfaction of personal interests.
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